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SIZE MATTERS (OR SHOULD) IN
COPYRIGHT LAW
Justin Hughes*
INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2001, there was a poster in the Paris Metro that was
surely a sign of the times in intellectual property. It was one of a series
sponsored by the transit authorities, each poster with a quotation from a
famous person. This one said, "Think of the Japanese painter who observes
a flower for three months and then sketches it in a few seconds." The
quotation was followed by "© Serge Gainsbourg (1928-1991)." 1  No
reference to a book, lecture, or song. Are we to think that the Gainsbourg
estate has a copyright on that sentence? That a complete work of
Gainsbourg's appears in footnote 1 and that this paragraph contains an
infringing derivative work-an English translation-of the entire
Gainsbourg "work"?
Many commentators have expressed concern about intellectual property
law becoming too "finely grained"-with claims of independent property
protection being draped over smaller and smaller pieces of creativity,
innovation, and expression. Professor J.H. Reichman was one of the first to
observe this problem,2 but others-including Pamela Samuelson, Henry
Perritt, James Boyle, and Rebecca Eisenberg-have contributed to our
awareness of how the size of independent property claims is a key variable
in the impact of intellectual property laws.3
* Associate Professor and Director, Intellectual Property Law Program, Cardozo Law
School, New York. The author has profited from the readings of different versions or
sections of this Article provided by Barton Beebe, Clyde Spillenger, Jessica Litman, David
Nimmer, and Michael Carroll. Thanks also to Nicholas Preston, Brisette Gantt, and Xiaomin
Zhang for research assistance. The remaining errors are the exclusive intellectual property
of the author.
1. "Il faut penser au peintre japonais qui regarde une fleur pendant trois mois et la
cerne en quelque secondes."
2. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Taking Stock: The Law and Economics of Intellectual
Property Rights: Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable
Innovation, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1743 (2002).
3. James Boyle, The Opposite of Property?, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring
2003, at 1, 30 (discussing how the granularity of copyright rights affects the public domain
because the public domain consists not only of works uncovered by copyright protection, but
also of a range of fine-grained liberties that are permitted with "protected" works); Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Property and Innovation in the Global Information Infrastructure, 1996 U. Chi.
Legal F. 261, 285 (noting that the combination of technology and economics has produced a
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Intellectual property scholars have tended to write about granular
protection arising in response to technologically driven legislative
proposals-such as database protection or the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act4-or existing laws' operation with technological
developments, such as gene sequencing that gives rise to patent claims over
express sequenced tags. 5  But there is a less-discussed aspect of this
problem: No matter where we are on the technological curve, enterprising
lawyers continually try to produce "fine-grained" protection of their client's
interests. Plain old skillful advocacy pushes copyright toward more finely
grained protection. The issue is not copyright protection per se: the issue is
independent protection of very small pieces of creative expression.
Plaintiffs have been arguing implicitly that the res that supports an
independent copyright can be very, very small indeed. As a function of
effective lawyering and changing technology, the implicit push is toward
protection of what might be called "microworks. ''6
The push is possible because American copyright law is an enormous
legal structure, full of defined terms, all built on one completely undefined
term: the "work." The Copyright Act defines a "collective work," a "work
made for hire," "literary works," a "joint work," and "a work of visual art."'7
But the law runs silent on the foundational concept on which these
definitions are built.8 Melville Nimmer made a push in the 1960s to add a
definition of a "single work" to the copyright statutes for purposes of
damage calculations. One participant in the reform project, Mort Goldberg,
commented, "[I]t seems to me that the problem is not that of defining what
a 'single work' is, but what 'the work' is that is being talked about."9
situation where people access more granular pieces of information-suggesting that the
property rules may respond to such developments).
4. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
5. See, e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Request for Comments on Revised
Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. Sec. 112,
para. 1 "Written Description" Requirement (1999), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2000/week09/patappl.htm (describing the
many comments received concerning the fairness and appropriateness of patenting expressed
sequence tags).
6. This is not to be confused with the art of microscopic writings or "micrography"
(miniature calligraphy). See, e.g., Val~re-Marie Marchand, Voyage au Pays de l'Infiniment
Petit.. ., Plumes, Apr.-May 2004, at 66.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 102 offers a nonexhaustive list of "categories" of copyrightable works,
but no definition of a "work." As Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters noted in 2004
testimony, "Although one might expect the extensive list of definitions in § 101 of the
Copyright Act to include a definition of as fundamental a term as 'work,' no such definition
is [sic] exists." Hearing on The Family Movie Act before the Subcomm. on Courts, The
Internet and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat061704.html (statement of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights).
9. House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., Copyright Law Revision, Part 4, at 147
(Comm. Print 1964) (Transcript of Meeting on Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright
Law: Discussions of §§ 35-42, Chicago, August 15-16, 1963).
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Nimmer's recommendation was not embraced, but the absence of any
definition of "work" is hardly unique to American law. Most, if not all,
modem copyright laws provide non-exhaustive exemplary lists of
copyrightable works, but do little or nothing to try to define the basic idea
of a "work."' 10 Not surprisingly, the same push to protect "microworks" can
be seen in disputes in England, the Netherlands, France, and Japan.
In general, American courts have denied blatant claims that very small
pieces of copyrightable material merit independent protection. They have
done so with a variety of devices. Under the fair use doctrine, the smaller
the amount copied, the fairer the copying. Courts have also deployed a "de
minimis" copying rule separate from, and antecedent to, any fair use
analysis. The de minimis rule expressly allows the copying of small and
insignificant portions of the plaintiffs work.1 However, neither of these
doctrines is an adequate device because each takes the work as its starting
point to measure the amount of copying.
10. Some countries give a bit more definition to a "work," but rarely anything that
advances our understanding. National copyright laws commonly describe protected "works"
as being in the tripartite realm of the literary, scientific, and/or artistic. Section 1 of the Act
Dealing with Copyright and Related Acts of Germany provides that "[a]uthors of literary,
scientific and artistic works shall enjoy protection for their works in the manner prescribed
by this Act." Friedrich-Karl Beier et al., German Industrial Property, Copyright and Antitrust
Laws II/B/3 (3d ed. 1996). Article 2(1) of the Copyright Act of South Korea similarly
defines "[w]orks" circularly as "creative production belonging to the category of original
literary, scientific or artistic works." Ministry of Culture & Tourism, Copyright Law of
Korea 1 (2000). The Korean law then provides, in a style similar to American law, specific
definitions for "[c]inematographic works," "[w]orks of applied art," and "[j]oint works." Id.
at 2-3. Some countries embellish the root notion of a "work" to provide that what is
protected are "works of the mind" or "intellectual creations." In Slovenia, Article 5(1) of the
Copyright and Related Rights Act provides that "[c]opyright works are individual
intellectual creations in the domain of literature, science, and art, which are expressed in any
mode." Slovn. Intellectual Prop. Office, Intellectual Property Laws and Regulations of the
Republic of Slovenia 65 (1996). In France, copyright protection extends to "works of the
mind, whatever the genre, form of expression, merit or destination" and follows this with a
long list of candidate works. Code de la Propridt6 Intellectuelle 17-20 (George Bonet et al.
eds., Dalloz 4th ed. 2004). Following French law, the copyright law in Senegal, under Law
No. 73-52 Relative to the Protection of Copyright, also uses the concept of an "original work
of the mind." Suivis du Reglement General, Bureau Senegalais du Droit d'Auteur, Textes
Relatifs au Droit d'Auteur et au B.S.D.A. [Texts Concerning Copyright and the Senegal
Copyright Bureau] 9, 11. Article 1 grants copyright protection to "toute oeuvre originale de
l'esprit (littdraire, scientifique ou artistique)," provides a typical, nonexhaustive list of
examples that "[s]ont notamment considdrs comme oeuvres de l'esprit au sens de la
prrsente loi," and states that an "original work" is a "work, that, in its characteristic elements
and in its form, or in its form only, permits the identifcation of its author." Id. Article 5
states as follows: "'Ouevre originale' s'entend d'une oeuvre qui, dans ses 616ments
caract6ristiques et dans sa forme, ou dans sa forme seulement, permet d'individualiser son
auteur." Id. Perhaps in the same spirit, in Japan, Article (2)(1)(i) of the Copyright Law
provides that a "'work' means a production in which thoughts or sentiments are expressed in
a creative way and which falls within the literary, scientific, artistic or musical domain."
Copyright Research & Info. Ctr., Copyright Law of Japan 6 (Yukifusa Oyarna et al. trans.,
1999).
11. See, e.g., G.R. Leonard & Co. v. Stack, 386 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1967); Werlin v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
20051
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Another device in American copyright law is a long-standing Copyright
Office rule that "[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, and
slogans" are not copyrightable. 12 No court has ever expressly doubted the
vitality of the rule. Yet this principle has been put under pressure in a
handful of cases. Some of these cases involve quantitatively insubstantial
copying that, nonetheless, is claimed to be qualitatively substantial. Other
cases involve naming or evaluation systems-products themselves of "soft"
information technology. These cases have produced even more troubling
intimations of independent copyright protection for extremely small
expressions.
This creeping protection of "microworks" is rooted in a fundamental
problem. The Copyright Office's regulatory bar against copyrighting short
phrases has historically been justified with copyright's "originality"
requirement: A small expression is deemed to lack sufficient originality. In
other words, any claim that the very small expression is a protected
"original work of authorship" is turned back on the issue of the expression's
being "original," not on the issue of the expression's being a "work." But it
is fundamentally disingenuous to use the originality requirement as the
doctrinal bar against copyright protection of titles, names, and short
phrases. Many very small expressions positively leap over the low
threshold of originality we have established in copyright law. The real
issue is not lack of originality; the real issue is size.
The smooth functioning of copyright law depends upon an implicit
"minimum size" principle. We have been wont to admit this because of our
inability to formulate the principle. How can we formulate a minimum size
principle in a one-size-fits-all copyright doctrine that embraces everything
from simple portraiture to massive architectural works, from Emily
Dickinson's poems to computer operating systems? Despite these
significant problems, this Article sketches some first steps in how we might
develop a minimum size principle and proposes that we acknowledge some
notions of minimum size in our idea of a "work." Size counts--or
should-in copyright law.
In this early period of digitization and the Internet, there is much
discussion of "remix culture." 13  Of course, any culture not in stasis is
12. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2004). The Rule states that "[w]ords and short phrases such as
names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of typographic
ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or contents" are not subject
to copyright. Id.
13. Contrary to the intimation in the Wikipedia, Wikipedia.org, Remix Culture (June 13,
2005), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remixculture, "remix culture" owes its origin to the
dance club scene, not Larry Lessig. (I am not aware of any direct connection between the
two.) The phrase may have started as a verb/noun phrase and then became an adjective/noun
phrase. The band Negativland was also an early adopter of the verb-noun phrase in their call
for broader fair use. See Negativland, Lawyers Lawsuits and Lies, Irish Times, Dec. 17,
1993, at 14 (noting that the expansion of the "Fair Use doctrine would serve to balance the
will of commerce to monopolise its products with the socially desirable urge of artists to
remix culture"). The phrase appears to have started in Europe's dance/electronica
community. See Andy Gill, For the People, by the People, Indep. (London), Oct. 6, 1994, at
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always a remix culture. People remix words, painters remix colors
(literally), musicians remix musical notes, and programmers remix source
code commands. Still, for describing the Internet and digitization, "remix
culture" is a better buzzword than "information highway." Perhaps we
might also say "recombinant culture" to capture a technological idea both
more organic and more recent than mixing music. 14  In our new
recombinant culture, digitization allows very small bits and pieces to be
copied and reused with extreme ease, while the Internet makes
unprecedented amounts of such bits and pieces instantly available for such
reuse. If the res of independent copyright protection shrinks to a
"microwork," this recombinant culture is burdened.
Some readers will immediately think of music sampling, but until
Bridgeport Music15 is overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court or, effectively,
by the important circuit courts for music litigation, the absolutism of the
Bridgeport Music doctrine actually makes the microwork problem
irrelevant for sound recordings. If any taking from a sound recording
constitutes infringement, it does not matter how big the "work" is, because
the de minimis, fair use, and merger doctrines are irrelevant.
That is definitely not true for software programming, kinds of text works,
and many artistic works, like collages. In the software industry, it is widely
25 (describing techniques of Rundgren's then-new album, in which "[tihe idea sounds more
in line with European remix culture than American rock culture"); Matthew Mirapaul, Why
Just Listen to Pop When You Can Mix Your Own?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 2001, at E2
(describing Icelandic artist Bjork as "among the first pop stars to take the plunge into remix
culture"). The phrase had immigrated to the U.S. by the early 1990s. See Larry Flick, 'Star-
System' Policies Dim Nightclubs'Appeal, Billboard, Jan. 11, 1992, at 19 (describing a set of
"DJ-only" albums, the first to be called "Remix Culture"). But its extension to other cultural
areas might have happened in the European zeitgeist before it happened in the U.S. See Jim
McClellan, In the Path of the Net Pioneers, Life: The Observer Mag., Apr. 9, 1995, at 64
(describing "a new kind of journalism, something influenced by music's remix culture").
14. See 13 Oxford English Dictionary 347 (2d ed. 1989); Answers.com, Recombinant,
http://www.answers.com/topic/recombinant (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
15. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). In Grand
Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the
sampling of three words and a short keyboard riff from the song "Alone Again (Naturally)"
triggered copyright liability. Judge Kevin Duffy's decision "left behind the impression of a
per se bar to unlicensed digital sampling." Susan Latham, Newton v. Diamond, Measuring
the Legitimacy of Unauthorized Compositional Sampling-A Clue Illuminated and
Obscured, 26 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 121, 124 (2003); see also Donald S. Passman, All
You Need to Know About the Music Business 296 (1997) (noting that the Grand Upright
case marked the "[e]nd of the days of casual sampling"); Susan Upton Douglass & Craig S.
Mende, Deconstructing Music Sampling: Questions Arise as Practice Becomes Increasingly
Common, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 3, 1997, at S3 (noting that after Grand Upright, "[t]he assumption
was that if any copying occurred, then there was infringement"). But the Bridgeport Music
decision is critically different. Unlike the Grand Upright Music opinion, which launched the
music industry's current music sampling licensing practices with little more than its "thou
shalt not steal" admonition, the carefully reasoned Bridgeport Music opinion hones close to
the particular statutory provisions for sound recordings. This Article will not dissect Judge
Ralph Guy's opinion because his analysis turns on the copyright provisions unique to sound
recordings, and does not bear directly on the qualitatively substantial, de minimis, fair use, or
merger doctrines.
2005]
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accepted that programmers reuse sections of code from prior programs.16
On the issue of infringement, one attorney working in the field commented,
"The problem lies in figuring out what is a substantial part of a software
program."' 7 But notice the assumption that the "work" is a "software
program." What if the work was a subroutine of the original software
program? Then, we would likely be in a world where fair use would be
useless to programmers "borrowing" code because any time a person copied
a single subroutine, she would be copying an entire work. Or consider the
work of bloggers, where the coin of the kingdom is a posting and much of
what is most interesting is bloggers commenting on one another. Copyright
microwork protection could easily become a tool to harass those
commentators with whom one does not agree. '8
This Article begins with a discussion of recent cases. Part I examines
cases in which courts have turned back blatant efforts to propertize very
small pieces of copyrightable material and cases in which courts have
suggested that extremely fine-grained res, i.e., microworks, can enjoy
independent copyright protection. Part II then describes how these cases
are the predictable offspring of the "work" replacing the "book" as the basic
statutory subject of copyright protection in the nineteenth century. The
ambiguity latent in the concept of a "work" could only blossom fully when
registration was eliminated as a requirement for copyright protection; until
then, the system largely policed itself in terms of the size and concept of
"works" which creators and owners deemed worthy of protection.
Part III then looks at how copyright's originality doctrine has been used
to hold back the pressure to protect "microworks;" how this has become a
largely indefensible border; and how it would be useful for courts to have
some kind of "minimum size" principle in their doctrinal toolbox. Various
rationales against creeping microwork protection are sketched out in Part
IV. Part V then considers how we might elaborate a minimum size
principle. Recognizing that this will not be an easy task, the discussion is
limited to written word (text) works. It is with text works that the problem
of microwork protection has emerged most starkly. Part V also looks at the
area of statutory damages where courts (and Congress) already have
grappled expressly with how to establish the number of "works" infringed.
Part V concludes that the test for an independently protected work will
remain resistant to ex ante formulae and the only guidance to be offered is a
rough framework of considerations.
16. See Michael Parsons, Careless Coders Tempting Legal Troubles?, CNET
News.com, June 3, 2004, http://news.com.com/2100-1008-5226035.html.
17. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
18. For Lawrence Lessig, "[t]he best of the blog entries are relatively short; they point
directly to words used by others, criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the
most important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have." Lawrence Lessig,
Free Culture 41 (2004).
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I. RECENT CASES PRESSING THE FRONTIER OF MINIMUM SIZE
American copyright law has a long-standing bar against the copyrighting
of "[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar
symbols or designs; mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering
or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or contents." 19 Although the bar
expressly exists only in the regulations of the Copyright Office, courts have
applied this rule against claims of copyright in the names or titles of a
literary work,20 an insurance policy, 21 a musical composition,22 an
executive summary,23 a newsletter,24 a play,25 a radio program, 26 a comic
19. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2004).
20. See, e.g., Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1943) ("[I]t is well
settled that the copyright of a book or play does not give the copyright owner the exclusive
right to the use of the title."); Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 F. 398, 403 (8th Cir.
1913) ("[T]he copyright of a book does not prevent others from taking the same title for
another book, though the copyright has not expired," and ."[n]either the author nor
proprietor of a literary work has any property in its name."' (quoting Black v. Ehrich, 44 F.
793, 794 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891))); see also Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 passim
(1911) (noting that the book and moving picture had the same name, "Ben Hur," but that the
copyright claim was based on a dramatizing right and not mentioning the defendant's
copying of title).
21. See, e.g., Arvelo v. Am. Int'l Ins. Co., 875 F. Supp. 95, 97 (D.P.R. 1995) (noting that
plaintiffs "invented the name 'Retail Plus' for the new insurance policy" but had no
copyright infringement claim against its use by the defendant).
22. See, e.g., Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437). The
court noted that with copyright "[tihe right secured is the property in the piece of music, the
production of the mind and genius of the author, and not in the mere name given to the work.
... [The name] is not the thing protected or intended to be protected." Id. at 914. But the
court did hold open the possibility that "in the case of a valid copy-right of the work[,] ....
[i]t may be that the title should be considered as falling within the purview of the statute, and
that to protect the work the court would be required to secure the title from piracy." Id. This
reasoning seemed either to be based on a fraud/unfair competition basis or might have been
an early kernel of the qualitatively substantial copying analysis of Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
23. See, e.g., Nikas v. Vietnam Veterans of Am., Inc., Copy. L. Dec. (CCH) 27,031
(D.D.C. 1992) (rejecting copyright claim on title "Standing Tall-Together" because "[iut
has been long held that the title of a copyrighted work does not itself qualify for copyright
protection").
24. See, e.g., Arthur Retlaw & Assoc., Inc. v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1010,
1014 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
25. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 311-12
(2d Cir. 1934) ("A copyright of a play does not carry with it the exclusive right to the use of
the title."); Nat'l Picture Theatres, Inc. v. Found. Film Corp., 266 F. 208, 210 (2d Cir. 1920)
("It is to be noted that plaintiffs asserted right does not rest on copyright, though derived
from a copyright owner; therefore it may be admitted that a name as such is not protected by
the Copyright Act ...."); Glaser v. St. Elmo Co., 175 F. 276 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Corbett
v. Purdy, 80 F. 901, 902 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1897) ("The right secured by the copyright act is the
property in the literary composition, and not in the name or title given to it. In no case, so
far as this court is advised, has protection been afforded by injunction under the copyright
laws to the title alone, separate from the book or dramatic composition which it is used to
designate."); Isaacs v. Daley, 39 N.Y. Super. Ct. 511, 513 (City of N.Y. 1874) ("The use of
the word 'Charity' as a designation for any work of art or literature can not ordinarily be
monopolized by any one person."). The Isaac v. Daley action appears to have proceeded
under a state common law copyright theory.
2005]
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strip,27 a motion picture, 2 8 and a newspaper (a compilation work).29 No
court has expressly rejected the rule or overruled a Copyright Office refusal
to register a copyright on those grounds. The bar against copyright
protection in titles and short phrases is also well (but not completely)
established in English law and in other jurisdictions with sophisticated
copyright jurisprudence. 30
Yet new variations of the claim for copyright in names and short phrases
arise, many related to new technologies. For example, in Ticketmaster v.
Tickets.com, Inc., 3 1 the defendant had been "scraping" concert information
from Ticketmaster's website. Given the Feist bar to copyright over the
concert information itself,32 Ticketmaster tried a variety of claims,
including claiming that it had copyright over the Uniform Resource
Locators ("URLs") which identify each Ticketmaster webpage.
26. See, e.g., Kirkland v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 425 F. Supp. 1111, 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(concerning a children's radio program named Land of the Lost, the court noted "it has been
well-established that a copyright in literary material does not secure any right in the title
itself' and proceeded to a trademark/unfair competition analysis).
27. See, e.g., Fisher v. United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1226 (D.
Colo. 1999) ("Furthermore, the name 'Chipper' is not subject to copyright protection."
(quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2004))).
28. See, e.g., Warner Bros. 70 F.2d at 311 ("A copyright of a play does not carry with it
the exclusive right to the use of the title.").
29. See, e.g., Duff v. Kansas City Star Co., 299 F.2d 320, 323-24 (8th Cir. 1962)
(holding that the newspaper name "Community Herald" could only be protected under
trademark laws, not copyright laws).
30. United Kingdom: Kelly v. Hutton, (1868) 37 L.J.R. 917, 921 (Ch.) (Eng.) ("Now, it
appears to us that there is nothing analogous to copyright in the name of a newspaper .... ");
Correspondent Newspaper Co. v. Saunders, (1865) 11 Jurist 540, 541 (Ch.) (Eng.)
(expressing doubt "whether the title is part of the copyright"). But see Shetland Times Ltd. v.
Wills, (1996) 1997 S.C. 316 (Scot.) (Outer House), available at 1996 WL 1093516 (finding
that headlines copied for hyperlinks could be literary works within the meaning of the
Copyright Statute, despite English precedent on titles not being protected by copyright); see
also Netlitigation, Linking, Framing, and Metatagging,
http://www.netljtigation.com/netlitigation/cases/shetland.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005)
(discussing the case). Australia: Sullivan v. FNH Inv. Pty Ltd. [2003] FCA 323, 112,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federalct/2003/323.html (Jacobson , J.)
(finding no copyright in slogans that lacked "judgment, effort and skill" required to be
original); see also Anne Fitzgerald & Brian Fitzgerald, Intellectual Property in Principle 89
(2004) (observing that, in Australia, "[silogans, titles and heading are not generally accepted
as having copyright protection because insufficient effort has gone into their formulation for
them to qualify as original literary works in themselves"). Canada: Francis Day & Hunter,
Ltd. v. Twentieth Century Fox Corp., [1940] A.C. 112, 124 (Can.) (noting that the statutory
definition that "'work' shall include the title thereof when such title is original and
distinctive" did not mean that a title was deemed to be a separate and independent "work").
Japan: Court Denies Copyright for Web News Headlines, Mainichi Daily News, Mar. 25,
2004 (discussing a case brought by newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun against an Internet service,
in which Judge Toshiaki Iimura concluded that "[u]sing headlines that are open to the public
on the Internet without authorization does not constitute a copyright violation").
Netherlands: L. Ernens Beheer B.V./Kolk, Gerechtshofte Amsterdam [Hof] [Ordinary court
of appeal of Amsterdam], 7 juli 2005 (Neth.),
http://www.boek9.nl/weblog2/images/slngle.pdf (recognizing that the word "Single" may
not be copyrighted under Dutch law).
31. No. CV 99-7654, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. March 7,2003).
32. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1991).
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Ticketmaster contended "that, although the URLs are strictly functional,
they are entitled to copyright protection because there are several ways to
write the URL, and, thus, original authorship is used. '33  Without
specifically invoking the bar on copyrighting short phrases, the court
concluded that the URLs lacked sufficient originality to warrant
copyright. 34
While courts usually fight off such naked efforts to copyright names and
short phrases, there are many occasions when courts have succumbed to
arguments that very small pieces of expression are worthy of independent
copyright protection. The situations in which judges drop their guard might
be roughly categorized into four groups. In the first kind of case, the
plaintiffs' claims of trademark and copyright protection are conflated or the
clear existence of trademark protection prevents a thorough exploration of
the copyright issues. In the second, judges simply succumb-at least in
dicta-to the allure of protecting highly original short phrases. In the third
kind of case, the doctrine of qualitatively substantial copying-the holding
of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises35-eads to de
facto protection of microworks. Finally, there has been a rash of post-Feist
cases involving evaluation and classification systems where the courts
elaborate a finely grained vision of copyright protection which implies
microwork protection.
The following discussion of the first two categories is limited because
these are essentially situations of erroneous reasoning. But the third and
fourth categories are more challenging because each involves basic
navigational tools of copyright giving us conflicting readings-as, all the
while, copyright advocacy presses us into uncharted realms.
A. Copyright and Trademark Claims Are Not Distinguished
The 1982 case of Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Industries, Inc.36
is perhaps the prime example of a litigation in which weak copyright claims
are coupled with more standard trademark claims. Universal brought suit to
stop the defendant from marketing merchandise "bearing prominent
inscriptions in the forms of 'I love E.T.' and 'E.T. Phone Home!!' 37 The
trademark and copyright issues are, to be charitable, intertwined through
much of the opinion. The court found, in order, (a) that Universal has
trademark rights in both the E.T. character and the name "E.T." (but does
not expressly find rights in the sayings), 38 (b) that the phrases "would be
33. Ticketmaster, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 6483, at *20.
34. Id. This claim could also have been dismissed on merger grounds-the URL's
functionality is inseparable from the expression. The fact of where to find the webpage in
question cannot be expressed any other way than with the URL. This is not practical merger,
it is absolute merger.
35. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
36. 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
37. Id. at 1165.
38. Id. at 1164. The court further stated that
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recognized readily by the average lay observer as having been appropriated
from Universal's copyrighted motion picture, '39 and (c) that Kamar's
"unauthorized use of the name 'E.T.' on its products, and its reproduction
of lines of dialogue from 'E.T. The Extra-Terrestrial' are likely to cause
confusion as to the source of Kamar's products." 40
The court followed a typical line of copyright reasoning to conclude that
"E.T." is a protected character and, then, atypically, that protection of the
name "E.T." follows under copyright law because the character is
protected.41 Kamar's use of the name was found to meet the "test for
infringement of a character" because "the average lay observer would
readily recognize the name 'E.T.' as having been taken from the
copyrighted character." 42 Of course, by those lights, any film review of the
movie also violated the copyright protection of the character, as would this
law review Article.
The district court went further, establishing de facto copyright protection
of the two celebrated phrases from the movie. The court reasoned that
"[t]he inscriptions on the defendant's products would be readily
recognizable to the lay observer as key lines of dialogue from the
copyrighted movie and, therefore, the test for copyright infringement has
been satisfied. ' 43 There is no de minimis discussion, no fair use analysis,
and no discussion of how these quantitatively insubstantial phrases were
nevertheless so qualitatively important to the film.44  The court then
returned to the discussion of Lanham Act violations and granted the
plaintiff preliminary injunctive relief. The only thing positive that can said
Universal has acquired valuable trademark and service mark rights in the "E.T."
name and character because of the wide-spread popularity and acclaim of "E.T.
The Extra-Terrestrial." The "E.T." character has become a valuable property right
and symbol distinctive of Universal and its motion picture, and the name "E.T."
has acquired a secondary meaning as indicating Universal's famous "E.T."
character.
Id.
39. Id. at 1165.
40. Id. The court also noted that the phrases were "prominently featured" in the
copyrighted film. Id.
41. Id. The court stated as follows:
The character "E.T." is a central component of "E.T. The Extra-Terrestial."
"E.T." is a unique and distinctive character about whom the movie resolves [sic]..
..[T]he Court believes, that "E.T." is more than a mere vehicle for telling the
story and that "E.T." actually constitutes the story being told. The name "E.T."
itself is highly distinctive and is inseparable from the identity of the character. The
use of the name "E.T." on Kamar's products inevitably conjures up the image and
appeal of the E.T. character. The Court finds that the average lay observer would
recognize readily the "E.T." name as used on Kamar's products as having been
taken from the central character of Universal's copyrighted motion picture.
Id.
42. Id. at 1166.
43. Id.
44. But in Nikas v. Vietnam Veterans ofAmerica, Inc., the court rejected both a claim of
copyright in the title "Standing Tall-Together" for an executive summary and a claim that
the "slogan is a significant fragment of the entire copyrighted manuscript." Copyright L.
Dec. (CCH) 27,031 (D.D.C. 1992).
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for loose copyright analysis in such cases is that the stronger trademark
claims almost certainly mean that mistakes, or over-aggressiveness about
copyright law, do not trigger more litigation.
B. Court Dicta that Sufficiently Original Short Phrases Are Protected by
Copyright Law
Occasionally, a court declines to find copyright liability but leaves a trail
of dicta suggesting that short phrases may be protected under copyright law.
An example of respected jurists leaving us with this kind of unexploded
ordinance is a footnote in a 1946 case in which Jerome Frank offered up the
noncontroversial idea that "[t]here may be wrongful copying, though small
quantitatively." 45 But he then gave as examples "if someone were to copy
the words, 'Euclid alone has looked on Beauty bare,' or 'Twas brillig and
the slithy toves."' 46
Another occasion of unfortunate dicta is found in Narell v. Freeman,47 a
1989 case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined
to find liability for the defendant's "admitted takings" which were "several
instances of identical phrases and the more numerous paraphrases. '48
Despite the fact that Judge Jerome Farris had just cited Benjamin Kaplan's
concerns about copyright protection of "small groups of words," 49 he
contrasted the phrases copied from the plaintiff with a Frank Zappa sound
recording title, "Weasels Ripped My Flesh," which Farris called an
"original and hence protected phrase." 50 There seems no reasonable way to
interpret this Zappa dicta other than to conclude that Judge Farris believed
"Weasels Ripped My Flesh" was a res capable of sustaining its own
independent copyright.
Finally, a bizarre yin-yang on this issue occurred just a few years earlier.
In 1979, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that the "Crazy Eddie" discount chain was liable for copyright infringement
in television advertisements which parroted trailers for the popular
Superman movie. 51 There is nothing in then-district Judge Pierre Leval's
opinion to indicate that the case turned on a single phrase. In fact, Judge
Leval stated that "nearly every aspect of defendant's commercial represents
a detailed copying of the plaintiff's trailers."' 52 But five years later, in
45. Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 487 n.8 (2d Cir. 1946).
46. Id.
47. 872 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1989).
48. Id. at 910.
49. Id. at911.
50. Id.; Frank Zappa & The Mothers of Invention, Weasels Ripped My Flesh (Rykodisc
USA 1970).
51. DC Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
52. Id. at 1178. The court stated as follows:
I have not the slightest doubt that nearly every aspect of defendant's commercial
represents a detailed copying of the plaintiff's trailers viewed in court, the only
variation occurring when defendant's name and business purpose is substituted for
the Superman character's name and purpose. Defendant's advertisement captures
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Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., the Second Circuit understood
Judge Leval's opinion as providing protection to "well known copyrighted
phrase(s)" like "Look! ... Up in the Sky! ... It's a Bird! ... It's a Plane!..
It's Superman!"' 53 The Second Circuit noted:
Especially in an era of mass communications, it is to be expected that
phrases and other fragments of expression in a highly successful
copyrighted work will become part of the language. That does not mean
they lose all protection in the manner of a trade name that has become
generic. No matter how well known a copyrighted phrase becomes, its
author is entitled to guard against its appropriation to promote the sale of
commercial products. That doctrine enabled the proprietors of the
Superman copyright to prevent a discount chain from using a television
commercial that parodied well-known lines associated with Superman. 54
Again, this was in the context of concluding that the particular defendant
was not liable. 55 But the dicta remains, suggesting that small, highly
original phrases can be protected under copyright law. 56
both the 'total concept and feel' and the characteristic detail or particularized
expression of the "Superman" trailers. The average lay observer would instantly
identify the defendant's commercial with the copyrighted material.
Id. (citations omitted).
53. Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 236, 242 (2d Cir. 1983).
54. Id. at 242 (citing D.C. Comics, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1177).
55. The court found that the defendant was not liable because the defendant was
engaged in parody and "st[ood] on a different footing from the products of a discount chain."
Id; see also Stratchbomeo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
In Arc Music Corp., the court found no substantial similarity between two works for using
the common word "mojo." While noting that "common phrases are generally not susceptible
to copyright protection," id. at 1405, the court opined that "unless the reappearing phrase is
especially unique or qualitatively important, there is no basis for inferring copying," id at
1404, suggesting that an especially unique short phrase would be the basis to infer copying.
See also Whitney v. Ross Jungnickel, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 751, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). In Ross
Jungnickel, Inc., the court reasoned that
only two lines are claimed to have been appropriated from plaintiffs' lyric, one of
which is from a source in the public domain. The similarity concededly ends
there. This would not prevent recovery if the lines claimed to have been
appropriated constitute an important and vital part of the two compositions rather
than being merely incidental or trivial.
Id.
56. There are also judicial opinions that are unclear as to whether short phrases in a
larger work are being individually protected. For example, Applied Innovation, Inc. v.
Regents of the University of Minnesota established copyright liability for the copying of
more than thirty psychological test questions. 876 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1989). Although the
decision includes language suggesting that the individual test statements are not "short
phrases" barred by Rule 202.1(a), the court also noted that "[w]e think the test statements
satisfy the minimal standard for original works of authorship within the meaning of the
copyright laws, at least within the context of the administration of the MMPI." Id. at 635
(emphasis added). This suggests that it was the overall work which was being judged for
copyright protection.
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C. The Defendant's Copying Is a Single Phrase, so Either the Phrase Is a
Qualitatively Substantial Taking of a Large Work or the Phrase Has De
Facto Independent Protection
In 1985, the Supreme Court gave its modem imprimatur to the notion
that copyright liability can be based on a quantitatively insubstantial, but
qualitatively substantial copying. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises,57 a story in The Nation describing former President
Gerald Ford's memoirs had included extensive "paraphrases, and facts
drawn exclusively from the manuscript," 58 but copyright liability was
anchored on the story having copied verbatim only "between 300 and 400
words"59 from President Ford's "200,000-word manuscript. '60
The Harper & Row decision only confirmed the longstanding use of a
"qualitative" measure as one alternative for a substantial similarity
judgment. In 1847, Story v. Holcombe61 announced reasoning that could
have just as easily been written by the Supreme Court 140 years later: "The
infringement of a copyright does not depend so much upon the length of the
extracts as upon their value. If they embody the spirit and the force of the
work in a few pages, they take from it that in which its chief value
consists." 62  In the 1980 case Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz,
Liechtenstein, Black Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., the court
concluded that copying excerpts of less than two minutes each from four
films ranging from seventy-two to eighty-nine minutes could be found to be
"qualitatively great" even if quantitatively small. 63
Whatever one's views about the qualitatively substantial doctrine, it is
clear that it can produce de facto protection of short phrases, textual or
musical. In Narell v. Freeman, Judge Farris quotes the first five lines of
Longfellow's epic poem, Paul Revere's Ride,64 concluding that "direct
57. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
58. Id. at 543.
59. Id. at 548. The courts were careful to exclude from this number quotations attributed
by President Ford to other people and quotations from U.S. Government documents, since
Ford would have no copyright claim over such expression. Id. at 565 & n.8, 566.
60. Id at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497).
62. Id. The court went on to say that while extensive quotation might be necessary for
criticism, "this privilege can not be so exercised as to supersede the original book," a line
that The Nation crossed when their "scoop" caused Time to cancel its serialization of the
Gerald Ford memoirs. Id.
63. Roy Exp. Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein, Black, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("We find that the jury could
reasonably have found, at least with respect to some of the films, that CBS' use was
quantitatively substantial. And even assuming that CBS' use of some of the films was
quantitatively small, the jury could reasonably have concluded that it was qualitatively
great."). The case also involved a three-minute, forty-five-second excerpt from a film of one
hour.
64. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d. 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1989). The lines, of course, are the
following:
Listen, my children, and you shall hear
Of the midnight ride of Paul Revere.
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copying of all of the [five] lines, or even of the first two lines, might
constitute infringement if the original held a valid copyright registration.- 65
In contrast, the court noted that the defendant before it "ha[d] not copied the
equivalent of a unique line or stanza," 66 a negative finding67 pregnant with
possible abuse in the future.
A very different fact pattern is presented in Foxworthy v. Custom Tees,68
a 1995 case concerning "You might be a redneck if . . ." jokes. The
comedian who made this joke routine famous brought suit against a t-shirt
maker that had used the same or similar phrases on t-shirts. The basis of
the comedian's action was copyright in (a) an album of his comedy routine;
(b) a calendar with 365 "You might be a redneck if .. " jokes; 69 and (c)
books of his redneck jokes, at least one of which was registered as a
"compilation" work.70  The court received in evidence eleven t-shirts
"bearing the exact same 'operative' language" as plaintiff s redneck jokes71
(presumably each of the eleven had one joke). The court concluded that the
plaintiff had shown the likelihood of success on the merits without any
consideration of how much copying the defendant had done.
Foxworthy could be interpreted either as a straightforward protection of
short phrases or as the qualitatively substantial doctrine producing de facto
short-phrase protection. As to the larger works-the calendar and the joke
book-there was no discussion of qualitative or quantitative appropriation:
Eleven jokes out of a 365-joke calendar (three percent) are not a
quantitatively substantial part of that work. As for the t-shirts, would each
be registerable as a "work"? Assuming the printing was a plain design,
then if any one t-shirt was copyrightable, it would be a copyright over a
single phrase. By glossing over these issues, the court implicitly allowed
for the possibility that each of the plaintiffs one-line redneck jokes was
copyrighted. 72
Although the facts were not reported in detail, this may also have been
what happened in the Eighth Circuit's 2003 affirmance of a copyright
liability judgment against Audi Volkswagen in Andreas v. Volkswagen of
On the eighteenth of April, in Seventy-five;
Hardly a man is now alive
Who remembers that famous day and year.
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Tales of a Wayside Inn: The Landlord's Tale: Paul
Revere's Ride, reprinted in The Poems of Longfellow 275 (Random House 1932).
65. Narell, 872 F.2d at 912.
66. Id.
67. Later in the opinion, Judge Farris properly analyzed the defendant's "takings" and
concluded that "[t]he similarities between the two works are neither quantitatively or
qualitatively significant" and that because of "the insubstantial nature of the copied passages,
no reasonable reader could conclude that the works are substantially similar." Id. at 913.
68. 879 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
69. Id. at 1204.
70. Id at 1217.
71. Id at 1214.
72. The court noted that the "[pilaintiff claims ownership to hundreds of jokes," id. at
1204, instead of stating that "plaintiff claims ownership of copyrighted works containing
hundreds of jokes."
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America, Inc. 7 3 The plaintiff in Andreas was the author of a drawing called
"Angels of Mercy" which had the caption: "Most people don't know that
there are angels whose only job is to make sure you don't get too
comfortable & fall asleep & miss your life."'74 Inspired by the drawing,
Audi's advertising agency created a commercial that "depicted an Audi TT
coupe in a garden surrounded by angelic looking, neoclassical statues" '75
and a voiceover which said, "I think I just had my wake-up call, and it was
disguised as a car, and it was screaming at me not to get too comfortable
and fall asleep and miss my life.''76 Incredibly, this was the basis for the
Eighth Circuit to reinstate a $570,000 jury award against Audi which the
district court had thrown out on a motion for judgment as a matter of law. 77
The emphasis is added above to show that Audi's literal copying of
expression was limited to ten words78 from a twenty-six word caption of a
copyrighted drawing. 79 Andreas's work was an art work with text, the
same as the greeting card designs in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co.,80 but unlike Roth Greeting Cards, Andreas's original drawing appears
to be extremely different from the Audi advertisement. 8 1
Finally, it is hard to think of a better example of the qualitatively
substantial doctrine producing short-phrase protection than Cook v.
Robbins, an unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion from 2000.82 Wade B.
73. 336 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2003).
74. Id. at 791.
75. Id. at 792.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 800.
78. I count an ampersand as a word.
79. In a subtle coding that bolsters the result, the circuit panel referred to these twenty-
six words as "the accompanying text" to the drawing. Andreas, 336 F.3d at 791.
80. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). In Roth Greeting Cards, all members of the appellate
panel concluded that the text on the greeting card was too commonplace for protection, but a
majority found liability on a consideration of "all elements" of the plaintiffs card, including
"text, arrangement of text, art work, and association between art work and text." Id at 1109.
81. Brian Andreas's drawing "Angels of Mercy" is available for viewing-and can be
purchased-at http://www.losgatoscompany.com/brianandreas.html and
http://www.16handsgallery.com/baprints.html. To the degree that the "angelic looking
neoclassical statues" were to be understood by the viewer as angels, perhaps Audi also
copied that general idea in Andreas's drawing.
82. Cook v. Robbins, Nos. 98-36242, 99-35141 & CV 97-1008 (9th Cir. filed Nov. 16,
2000) (ca9.uscourts.gov), available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/04485f8dcbd4el ea882569520074e698/06
c0e3346a7b91ab882569990061c40a/$FILE/9836242.pdf. Whatever the merits and demerits
of unpublished opinions under these circumstances, it may have been the best of bad
alternatives. See 9th Cir. R. 36-3 (unpublished dispositions are not binding precedent, except
under the law of the case). Unpublished and depublished opinions, in both state and federal
court, are a subject of great controversy. See Steven B. Katz, Without Precedent, L.A. Law.,
Mar. 2001, at 43 (discussing depublication practice in California, Arizona, and Hawaii state
courts); Hon. Edward R. Becker, Hon. Michael Boudin & Hon. Pierre N. Leval, Citation of
Unpublished Opinions: The Appellate Judges Speak, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (2005)
(transcript of a panel discussion held at Fordham University School of Law on February 15,
2005); Thomas F. Kibbey, Note, Standardizing the Rules Restricting Publication and
Citation in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 833 (2002).
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Cook was the author of a best-selling 1995 book, Wall Street Money
Machine, in which "Cook use[d] his experience as a former taxi cab driver
to advocate strategies for stock and stock option transactions. '83 Two of
the themes developed in Wall Street Money Machine were: (a) the "meter
drop," Cook's phrase to describe the strategy of seeking a series of small
gains instead of waiting for one big transaction; and (b) a "rolling stock," a
"stock that tends to consistently roll up to a specific price point and then
drop down to a specific price point in an obvious pattern of repeated
waves."
84
The defendant, Anthony Robbins, had been presenting his Financial
Power seminars since 1989. After Robbins read Wall Street Money
Machine,85 Robbins's August 1996 Financial Power seminar manual
included the phrase "meter drop" nine times and "rolling stock" twice. In
subsequent editions of the Financial Power manual, the phrase "rolling
stock" disappeared, but "meter drop" continued in six places.86 Cook filed
suit against Robbins, alleging Robbins copied eleven phrases from Wall
Street Money Machine. The trial court allowed four of these allegations of
copying to go to the jury. One of the four passages at issue included "meter
drop"; 87 another included "rolling stock."'88
The jury found that there had been infringement and awarded Cook
$655,900 in damages. The trial judge then granted judgment as a matter of
law in favor of the defendant on the grounds that Cook had proved no
causal link between Robbins's infringement and the profits from Robbins's
seminars (the basis for the $655,900 figure).89 The Ninth Circuit reversed
and ordered the jury award reinstated. Although far from a model of
clarity, the opinion seems to focus on the two phrases "meter drop" and
"rolling stock," not the full expression of the four passages at issue.90 The
83. Cook, at 3 (ca9.uscourts.gov).
84. Id.
85. At trial, it was adduced that Robbins's seminars had never used the phrases "meter
drop" or "rolling stock" before Robbins read Mr. Cook's book. Id.
86. Id. at 4.
87. Id. at 4-5. Concerning that phrase, Wall Street Money Machine had the sentence
"[m]oney is made on the meter drop" and Robbins's manual had "The ring toss/meter drop.
The most money is made on the ." The purpose of the blank in Robbins's manual
was to elicit participation from the audience, i.e., they were intended to mentally fill in the
blank with "ring toss/money drop." Id. at 5 n.3.
88. Wall Street Money Machine had the passage, "No one I know has come up with a
name for the type of investing I call 'Rolling Stocks.' It works on stocks that roll up and
down in repeated waves. . . . Some roll fast and some roll slow." Id. at 5 (ellipsis in
original). Robbins's manual had "A rolling stock is a stock that tends to consistently roll up
to a specific price point and then drop down to a specific price point in an obvious pattern
(repeated waves). Some of these companies roll fast (4-6 weeks) and some roll slow (8-10
weeks)." Id. Of the other two phrases, for one the plaintiff's book said, "You have to know
your exit before ever going in," and the defendant's manual said, "You have to know your
__ before going in," where the blank was intended to elicit "exit" during Robbins's
seminar. Id.
89. Id. at 6.
90. The court noted that Robbins himself had recognized the phrases as creative and
quoted Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), for the
[Vol. 74
SIZE M TTERS (OR SHOULD)
Ninth Circuit referred to evidence that the two phrases were, according to
Cook, "an 'important part of my book' and an 'important part of my life'
and "'the very essence of what I teach."' 91 Of course, the question should
have been whether Robbins copied a substantial amount of the book, not
Cook's teaching or his life. 92
Admittedly, those of us who have defended personality interests in
intellectual property 93 should pause before criticizing Cook; yet looking at
the four passages as a whole, most of the wording used in Robbins's
Financial Power manual was commonplace, and one is left with the Ninth
Circuit hanging copyright protection on the phrases "meter drop" and
"rolling stock." Alarmed that Cook would undermine Rule 202.1 (a), 94 the
Copyright Office proposed that the U.S. intervene to request rehearing en
bane. 95 Before an interagency review process produced consensus on
action by the U.S. Government, the parties settled and the Ninth Circuit
ordered the opinion remain unpublished. 96
D. Evaluation and Classification Cases that Create De Facto Independent
Protection of Microworks
In the cases discussed above, courts considered fairly traditional
expressive works. In this section we examine cases in which judges sought
copyright protection for what they perceived as genuine creativity in
nonfiction database products-all the while navigating around both the
Supreme Court's holding in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.9 7 and the merger doctrine. A decade of these cases has sculpted
a frontier of protection that respects Feist while rewarding originality, but
in the process these courts have subverted the prohibition on copyright in
short phrases. This subversion may have dramatic effects on recombinant
culture, ranging from software development to a wide array of literary
practices.
proposition that "'the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will
suffice."' Cook, at 12 (ca9.uscourts.gov).
91. Id. at 14.
92. There was no other evidence in the opinion that the court was considering
infringement of written materials that Cook had prepared for his own seminars, which would
have made the issue of "teaching" more directly relevant. If Robbins had been alleged to
have copied Cook's written materials for his seminar, there would have been completely
different issues of access to the copyrighted work.
93. See Justin Hughes, The Personality Interests of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual
Property, 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 81 (1998); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and
the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
94. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2004).
95. See Letter from David Carson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office, to Robert E.
Kopp, Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Dec. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Carson Letter] (on file
with author).
96. See supra note 82.
97. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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In CCC Information Services v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc.,98
Maclean Hunter published the well-known "Red Book" of used car
valuations. These valuations were "the editors' projections of the values for
. . . used cars (up to seven years old)," 99 adjusted for condition of the
vehicle, the vehicle's options, and the geographic region of the car's sale.
The defendant had for years been "loading major portions of the Red Book
onto its computer network and republishing Red Book information in
various forms to its customers." 100  Nonetheless, the trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the valuations were
unprotectable facts-a fascinating issue in its own right. 1 1
The Second Circuit reversed, with Judge Leval reasoning that the
selection and arrangement of the Red Book was protectable and, more
importantly for our purposes, that the valuations in the Red Book were
themselves protectable. The court found sufficient "selection and
arrangement" originality through different aspects of the Red Book. 10 2 For
example, originality was found in Maclean's "selection of the number of
years' models to be included in the compilation" (seven years); "the
selection and manner of presentation of optional features for inclusion"; and
"the adjustment for mileage by 5,000 mile increments (as opposed to using
some other breakpoint and interval)."' 10 3
Judge Leval also found that originality was expressed in the particular
regions into which Maclean had divided the country. 10 4 Judge Leval
implied that the selection of regions was "original" because it produced not
wholly accurate car values. "The number produced is necessarily both
approximate and original."' 05  In short, because Maclean's regional
divisions failed to capture real car values, 106 the selection of those regions
is marked with originality-a view that is both strange sounding and
98. 44 F.3d 61 (2d. Cir. 1994).
99. Id. at 63.
100. Id. at 64.
101. See id. (discussing the National Automobile Dealers' Association's "Blue Book" and
observing that "the laws of certain states use th[e] average figure [from the two books] as
minimum for insurance payments upon the 'total loss' of a vehicle"). This integration into
state law certainly gives rise to the argument that the Red Book prices were "law" or "fact"
in the sense of being an integral result of a law's application.
102. Id. at 67. The court found that "the selection and arrangement of data in the Red
Book displayed amply sufficient originality to pass the low threshold requirement to earn
copyright protection." Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The court stated,
A car model does not command the same value throughout a large geographic
sector of the United States .... A 1989 Dodge Caravan will not command the
same price in San Diego as in Seattle. In furnishing a single number to cover vast
regions that undoubtably [sic] contain innumerable variations, the Red Book
expresses a loose judgment that values are likely to group together with greater
consistency within a defined region than without.
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sensible from copyright's basic premises. 107 Further, the decisions made on
the "selection" of regions and mileage increments and optional features
themselves determined the car valuations, so that any originality in those
choices would seem to permeate necessarily into the car valuations
themselves. '0 8
While the Maclean Hunter trial had treated the valuations as facts, 10 9
Maclean's evidence demonstrated without rebuttal that its car valuations
were neither reports of historical prices nor mechanical derivations of
historical prices or other data. Instead of being Feistian facts, they "were
predictions based not only on a multitude of data sources, but also on
professional judgment and expertise." 110  It is at this point, with his
attention focused on distinguishing the Red Book numbers from
uncopyrightable facts, that Judge Leval made a worrisome slip, reasoning
that "It]he valuations themselves [were] original creations of Maclean."''I
Not that the Red Book itself was an original creation-which would have
adequately supported the finding of liability-but that the numbers were
original "creations" in the plural. The implication is that each valuation is
an independently copyrightable creation. 112 It is this reasoning which sets
the stage for the Ninth Circuit's analysis in CDN Inc. v. Kapes.
113
In Kapes, CDN published the "Coin Dealer Newsletter, a weekly report
of wholesale prices for collectible United States coins" which "include[d]
prices for virtually all collectible coins and [was] used extensively by
dealers."114 Defendant Kenneth Kapes operated a website with a feature
107. David Nimmer has developed the similar point that the originality in a scholar's
reconstruction of the text of the Dead Sea Scrolls appears to be in the mistakes. See David
Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 38 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 141-43 (2001).
108. Dan Burk has noted that the metrics for a used car's value are arguably
uncopyrightable system methods of operation or system under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). In that
sense, Leval picked an odd starting point to find copyrightability. See Dan L. Burk,
Expression, Selection, Abstraction: Copyright's Golden Braid, 55 Syracuse L. Rev. 593,
613 (2005).
109. Maclean Hunter Mkts. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d at 64 (noting that the trial court fudged
the issue a bit, also calling the valuations "interpretations of facts").
110. Id. at 67. But Judge Leval's own opinion may slip in its very first steps, by framing
the case's question as being "the scope of protection afforded by the copyright law to such
compilations of informational matter." Id. at 63. A compilation of nonfactual, informational
matter? I have written elsewhere on the almost metaphysical (and even more certainly
epistemological) question whether the car valuations in the Red Book are "facts." See Justin
Hughes, Copyright and the Collapse of the Fact/Value Distinction (July 29, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
111. Maclean Hunter Mkts. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d at 67.
112. The court recognized a two-level hierarchy of ideas. The first level consists of
"building block" ideas and the second consists of "ideas of [a] weaker category, infused with
opinion." Id. at 72-73. The court reasoned that protection of "the weaker, suggestion-
opinion category" of ideas can be tolerated because restricting access to such expressions
"will not inflict injury on the opportunity for public debate, nor restrict access to the kind of
idea that illuminates our understanding of the phenomena that surround us or of useful
processes to solve our problems." Id. at 73.
113. 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999).
114. Id. at 1257-58.
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called The Fair Market Coin Pricer ("Pricer").115 The defendant's Pricer
carried retail prices derived from the plaintiffs wholesale prices by
application of a simple algorithm (i.e., a wholesale $10 price might become
a retail $12.50 price through a twenty-five percent markup). On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit recognized that the sole issue before it was "whether the
prices are copyrightable."'' 16
Both the trial and appellate courts focused on distinguishing the CDN
prices from the Feist telephone numbers. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the plaintiff, concluding that CDN's "prices are original
creations, not uncopyrightable facts,""l 7 again framing the discussion in
terms of plural creation. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the
reasoning in Maclean applied on all fours: Like the used car valuations, the
wholesale coin prices in CDN's newsletter were the result of"a process that
involves using [the editors'] judgment to distill and extrapolate from factual
data." 118  In keeping with both Maclean Hunter and the trial court's
opinion, the evaluations were treated individually. Judge Diarmuid
O'Scannlain referred to the protected items as either "prices" or
"creations."1 19  The court then veered into new territory, saying (a)
implicitly that the prices are ideas, and (b) explicitly that copyright law
sometimes protects ideas:
CDN does not, nor could it, claim protection for its idea of creating a
wholesale price guide, but it can use the copyright laws to protect its idea
of what those prices are. Drawing this line preserves the balance between
competition and protection: it allows CDN's competitors to create their
own price guides . . . but protects CDN's creation, thus giving it an
incentive to create such a guide .... The doctrine of merger does not bar
copyright protection in this case. 120
There is a key difference between Maclean Hunter and this case. In
Kapes what is being protected must be CDN's evaluative judgments
because Kapes was not reproducing the CDN expressions themselves. The
actual CDN wholesale prices had been changed by Kapes's algorithm. This
is clearly akin to recognition of a right of translation or adaptation in a
literary work. Indeed, one might be tempted to say that Kapes's algorithm
translated from the language of "wholesale" to the language of "retail."
But for our purposes, the real problem is the Kapes court's apparent
understanding of a "work." The Ninth Circuit described CDN's work in a
way that makes each price a creative "compilation":
115. Id. at 1257.
116. Id. at 1258 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 1258. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Feist telephone
numbers lacked any creative spark, but reasoned that "[t]his spark glows in CDN's prices,
which are compilations of data chosen and weighed with creativity and judgment." Id. at
1260.
118. Id. at 1261.
119. Id. at 1259. Judge O'Scannlain was following the district court judge, who
also labeled the numbers as "creations." Id. at 1258.
120. Id. at 1262.
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CDN's process to arrive at wholesale prices begins with examining the
major coin publications to find relevant retail price information. CDN
then reviews this data to retain only that information it considers to be
most accurate and important .... CDN also reviews the online networks
for the bid and ask prices posted by dealers. It extrapolates from the
reported prices to arrive at estimates for prices for unreported coin types
and grades. CDN also considers the impact of public auctions and private
sales, and analyzes the effect of the economy and foreign policy on the
price of coins .... The prices CDN creates are compilations of data that
represent its best estimate of the value of the coins. 12
1
The court says that the "prices . ..are compilations" (note the use of
plurals), squarely intimating that each individual price counts as a single
compilation. 122 Even if the court did not mean "compilation" in the sense
of a "compilation work," the court's reasoning strongly suggests that an
individual CDN wholesale price is a protected "work." And one
(reasonable) interpretation is that the court meant that an individual number
is a "compilation work."'1 2
3
Unfortunately, Maclean Hunter and Kapes are not the only suggestions
that individual numbers merit independent copyright protection; the same
thing has happened repeatedly in what we might call the "taxonomy cases."
These cases are the Seventh Circuit's 1997 decision in American Dental
Ass 'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass 'n, the Ninth Circuit's treatment of parallel
issues the same year in Practice Management Information Corp. v.
American Medical Ass 'n, and a Pennsylvania district court's 2000 analysis
in Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.
The work at issue in American Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans
Ass'n, 124 was the Code on Dental Procedures and Nomenclature ("ADA
Code"), a taxonomy of dental procedures, each procedure with a long
description, a short description, and a numeric designation. 125 Delta Dental
published a book which "include[d] most of the numbering system and
short descriptions from the ADA's Code."' 126 About the same time, the
Ninth Circuit was deciding the strikingly parallel Practice Management
Information Corp. v. American Medical Ass'n case, 127 in which Practice
Management had engaged in wholesale reproduction of the American
121. Id. at 1260 ("CDN employs the process described above that satisfies the 'minimal
degree of creativity' demanded by the Constitution for copyright protection.").
122. Id.
123. This is a point that the U.S. has recognized in other filings. See Brief for the United
States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 14 n. 11, Southco, Inc. v.
Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-1102) ("The CDN court went
beyond CCC and treated each individual valuation as a 'compilation' copyrightable in itself,
despite a statutory definition of 'compilation' that on its face is inapplicable to an individual
number." (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)) (other citation omitted)). The author participated
in the preparation of that brief.
124. 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
125. Id. at 977.
126. Id.
127. 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Medical Association's Physicians' Current Procedure Terminology
("CPT"). The CPT assigns five-digit codes to various medical procedures
in a taxonomy that sounds very similar to the American Dental Association
("ADA") system. Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits found that the
respective taxonomies were protected by copyright, with the Ninth Circuit
then directing its attention to the impact of the CPT's adoption by the
Medicare/Medicaid system. 128  Attention to these cases from legal
commentators has generally focused on their crafting of post-Feist
protection of nonfiction, database works; copyright misuse; or copyrighting
"law."'1 29 What has gone unnoticed is how Judge Frank Easterbrook's
Delta Dental opinion gently advances microwork protection.
When the ADA sued Delta Dental, the district court ruled that the ADA
Code was only a "useful" taxonomy and, therefore, lacked the modicum of
creativity necessary for copyright.' 30  On appeal, Judge Easterbrook
concluded that that the long descriptions were unquestionably copyrightable
and that the "original long descriptions make the work as a whole
copyrightable."131
This conclusion seems correct, but Judge Easterbrook further reasoned
that "[c]lassification is a creative endeavor,"' 132 concluding that "all three
elements of the [ADA] Code-numbers, short descriptions, and long
descriptions-are copyrightable subject matter. ' 133  Judge Easterbrook
further emphasized that "even the short descriptions and the number are
original works of authorship."' 34 Again, this plural wording implies that
each short description and each number is an original work of authorship-
akin to the fine-grained protection suggested in Kapes and Maclean
Hunter.135
128. Id. at 520-21.
129. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1095 (2003)
(discussing Practice Management for its copyright misuse aspects); Lawrence Cunningham,
Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104
Mich. L. Rev. 291 (2005) (discussing these cases as examples of copyright over aspects of
the legal system); Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital
Age, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1025 (1998) (discussing cases as post-Feist developments);
Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2004) (discussing
these cases as examples of copyright over aspects of the legal system).
130. Am. Dental Ass'n, 126 F.3d at 978.
131. Id. at 979.
132. Id. However, we should temper any categorical statement that all classification is a
creative endeavor. Some classification schemes may be so obvious that the activity of
classification would not be a creative endeavor.
133. Id.
134. Id. This statement, implying individual "work" status for each number actually
appears in the opinion before the more general and less worrisome conclusion that "all three
elements of the [ADA] Code-numbers, short descriptions, and long descriptions, are
copyrightable subject matter." Id.
135. The Delta Dental court casts some doubt on the statement that short descriptions and
numbers are original works of authorship by stating that it did not find that the Code on
Dental Procedures and Nomenclature ("ADA Code") was a compilation work under 17
U.S.C. § 103. Judge Easterbrook's point at that juncture of the opinion, however, seems to
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Delta Dental then takes a couple of steps back from this dangerous line
by reasoning that the § 102(b) bar on copyright in ideas, systems, and
processes would "permit[] Delta [Dental] to disseminate forms inviting
dentists to use the ADA's Code when submitting bills to insurers" and also
"precludes the ADA from suing, for copyright infringement, a dentist
whose office files record treatments using the Code's nomenclature."' 36 In
other words, Easterbrook seems to say that a practitioner could not be sued
for just writing the designation numbers-an activity that would literally
reproduce such numbers-although a publisher who competes with the
ADA might be sued for reproducing them. This distinction may follow our
intuitions on unfair competition and seems to give the ADA an Immigration
and Naturalization Service-like quasi-property right against competitors,
but not against individuals. Yet the distinction makes a hash out of § 106
rights; 137 it would be more sensible to say that an individual practitioner's
form-filling never produces a work substantially similar to the ADA Code
as a whole.
The Delta Dental reasoning protecting individual numbers (at least
against competitors) found further traction in a 2000 case, Southco, Inc. v.
Kanebridge Corp. (Southco I).138 The plaintiff in Southco manufactured a
line of fasteners. Each fastener model was designated with a nine-digit
number beginning with an arbitrary "forty-seven" and using the remaining
seven digits to "denote functional characteristics of each product, for
example, installation type, thread size, recess type (phillips or slotted),"
etc. 139 In competing with Southco, the defendant Kanebridge (a) published
comparison charts showing Southco parts numbers with their counterpart
Kanebridge parts numbers 140 ; and (b) on occasion, labeled its own parts
with Southco numbers. Southco alleged that Kanebridge had "copied some
or all" of fifty-one specified nine-digit part numbers from a Southco
handbook which contained over 1000 discrete parts numbers. 14 1  The
Eastern District of Pennsylvania court granted a preliminary injunction,
concluding that "Southco [was] likely to succeed in establishing that its
product identification numbers are copyrightable" and that Kanebridge
could be liable for copying "Southco's numbering system."' 142 Instead of
be to deny the preexisting, Feistian factness of the numbers, short descriptions, and long
descriptions. Id. at 980.
136. Id; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
138. 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1490 (E.D. Pa. 2000), rev'd 258 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2001),
appeal on remand, 324 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2003), reh'g en banc, 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).
139. Id.
140. Southco, Inc., 258 F.3d at 150.
141. Southco 1, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490. The "copied" Southco numbers came
either from a Southco "Handbook" or a "Supplement" to one of the company handbooks.
142. Id. The parties had previously agreed on a temporary restraining order "containing
various restrictions on Kanebridge's use of Southco's part numbers." Southco, Inc., 258 F.3d
at 150. The appellate court focused on the comparison chart's use of Southco numbers, and
it is reasonable to infer that the parties' disagreement as to the scope of a stipulated
injunction was focused here.
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building its analysis on the fact that only fifty-one of over 1000 numbers
had been copied, the district court adopted reasoning similar to the Kapes
and Delta Dental courts: "To the extent each nine-digit number is
copyrighted, Kanebridge would be copying the entire copyrighted
material."143
The Third Circuit reversed on the grounds that the numbers "fail[ed] to
satisfy the originality requirement" for copyright protection. 144 The court
nntP(1 that the district court had not distinguished copyright in "the
numbering system" from any copyright in the "actual numbers produced by
the system,"'145 but when such a distinction was recognized, the rigorous
nature of Southco's numbering system made it "impossible for the numbers
themselves to be original."' 146 But the silence of the court in Southco I on
the "finely granular" vision of copyright protection 147 adopted by the
district court prompted another three rounds of proceedings. On remand,
the district court judge granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, despite a new declaration from a Southco employee, Robert
Bisbing, describing the creativity he used in creating some new individual
numbers (for new products). Southco appealed and, in Southco II, a new
Third Circuit panel agreed that the Bisbing declaration raised "a genuine
issue of material fact that assigning product numbers . . . involve[s]
creativity and choice about how the fastener[s] should be characterized, and
thus that the product numbers are not mechanically derived from the
numbering system."'148
This ruling prompted the U.S. Government to intervene and try to
convince the Third Circuit that individual part numbers are simply not
copyrightable, even if "the Bisbing declaration states that Bisbing exercised
creativity and choice in determining the values to be reflected in the
143. Southco I, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
144. Southco, Inc., 258 F.3d at 151.
145. Id. (acknowledging the same distinction drawn in the amicus brief from the U.S.
Government). The court called it "the amicus brief submitted on behalf of the U.S. [Patent
and Trademark Office]," id. at 151 n.5, but the U.S. amicus brief was filed by the
Department of Justice, the Patent and Trademark Office, and the Copyright Office. The
author participated in the drafting of that brief. After drawing the distinction above, the U.S.
amicus brief also raised the issue whether any use of Southco's "system" could infringe a
protectable copyright interest given the bar to the protection of methods of operation in 17
U.S.C. § 102(b).
146. Id. at 153. As amicus curiae, the U.S. Government had argued that the Southco
numbers lacked creativity because each number was the result of the "mechanical
application of a set of rules to well-defined physical characteristics of a retractable captive-
screw assembly," Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant at 12, Southco, Inc., 258 F.3d at 148 (No. 00-1102), such that, as the trial court
found, once a third party was familiar with Southco's rules for numbering, that person would
know the part's "size, finish, and utility" based "on the content and arrangement of its
product number." Southco 1, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1490.
147. This was implicitly embraced because the panel wrote "these numbers are examples
of works that fall short of the minimal level of creativity required for copyright protection."
Southco, Inc., 258 F.3d at 152.
148. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. (Southco I), 324 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2003),
reh'g en banc, 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).
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numbers."'149 The Third Circuit granted rehearing en banc in April 2003150
and issued an opinion finally getting things right on December 3, 2004.
The en banc Southco 111 decision 151 announced that Southco's part numbers
were not copyrightable for two separate reasons: (a) "[T]he Southco
product numbers are not 'original' because each number is rigidly dictated
by the rules of the Southco [numbering] system"'152 and (b) "[t]he Southco
part numbers are also excluded from copyright protection because they are
analogous to short phrases or the titles of works."' 153  Expressing
"deference" to the Copyright Office's bar against protection for short
phrases, the court concluded that the bar "logically extends to part
numbers,"' 154 a position the U.S. Government had initially advocated in
Southco L
Southco III finally put the brakes-at least in one circuit--on the
dangerous reasoning that an individual number might be protectable
because of the research, analysis, and judgment involved in each valuation
or designation. But it is important to understand that such reasoning is not
anomalous; it is the unsurprising result of the copyright principle that any
original fixed expression is entitled to copyright protection. Citing no
authority at all, two British copyright commentators asserted in the 1980s
that in the United Kingdom "[a] mathematical or chemical formula may be
accorded protection as an original literary work, where substantial skill or
labour are involved in its construction." 155
Yet that is surely wrong, even before we get to functionality and merger
considerations. Consider a simple thought experiment: If an expert
working for Maclean Hunter or CDN provided a single valuation, perhaps
149. Id. at 197.
150. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., No. 02-1243, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 9786 (3d
Cir. Apr. 25, 2003).
151. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. (Southco 111), 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).
152. Id. at 282.
153. Id. at 285. Interestingly, three Third Circuit judges (Becker, McKee, and Smith) did
not join this portion of the en banc decision.
154. Id. at 286-87.
155. J.A.L. Sterling & M.C.L. Carpenter, Copyright Law in the United Kingdom and the
Rights of Performers, Authors and Composers in Europe 56, 223 (1986). They go on to
write,
[B]ut in the case of a published formula, a license to copy the formula may be
implied and even where the written expression of the formula is held to be
protected by copyright, the protection, if granted, would only extend to the order
and characters of the symbols in the formula, not to the system of the formula. No
infringement of copyright would occur where the instructions of the formula are
followed by putting together the constituents of the formula.
Id. The last part of this sentence is an unsurprising corollary of the Baker v. Selden rule,
now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), that there is "a clear distinction between the book, as
such, and the art which it is intended to illustrate," 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879), with only the
former being protected by copyright. The first part, however ("but in the case of a published
formula, a license to copy the formula may be implied"), shows how distorted copyright
becomes when according this kind of finely granular protection. If the formula is really a
"work," how would its publication create an implied license to copy? Try applying that rule
sensibly across the universe of copyrighted works.
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as a consultant hired to do so, would we consider that single number
copyrightable? If the ADA announced, sui generis, a single-number
designation for a dental procedure or Southco did the same thing for a
single, popular part, would we permit a copyright on that name? If the
answer to these questions is no, then something went amiss in these cases
until the en banc majority opinion in Southco III.
II. FROM "BOOK" TO "WORK"
Modem Anglo-American copyright law arose in the eighteenth century
with little reliance on the concept of the "work." In England, the objects of
protection in the Statute of Anne (1710) were "Copies of Printed Books."'1 56
In 1783, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress passed a resolution
"recommend[ing] to the several states, to secure to authors or publishers of
any new books not hitherto printed . . . such copy or exclusive right of
printing, publishing and vending the same .... -"157 A few years later, when
Congress passed the first federal copyright law in the United States, the
resulting "[a]ct for the encouragement of learning" gave authors rights in
"any map, chart, book or books."'1 58
In the nineteenth century and twentieth century, American copyright law
was revised repeatedly so as to encompass additional types of creations: 159
"prints" (1802),160 music (1831),161 dramatic compositions (1856),
156. 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
157. 8 Journal of the United States in Congress Assembled, Containing the Proceedings
from the First Monday in November 1782, to the First Monday in November 1783, at 256-57
(1783); see also Francine Crawford, Pre-Constitutional Copyright Statutes, 23 Bull.
Copyright Soc'y 11, 13 (1975).
158. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. The statute was described by Justice
Miller as follows:
The first Congress of the United States, sitting immediately after the formation
of the Constitution, enacted that the "author or authors of any map, chart, book, or
books, being a citizen or resident of the United States, shall have the sole right and
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending the same for the period of
fourteen years from the recording of the title thereof in the clerk's office, as
afterwards directed.
H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 2 (1909) (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53, 56-57 (1883)), cited in 8 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright app. 13-4 (2005) [hereinafter Nimmer on Copyright]; see also Copyright Act of
1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (protecting maps, books, and charts). In keeping with that
observation, the Philadelphia Spelling Book was the first work registered under the first U.S.
copyright statute. See U.S. Copyright Office, Circular la, A Brief History and Overview
(2005) [hereinafter U.S. Copyright Office, Circular I a], available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ l a.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
159. All of these are listed in U.S. Copyright Office, Circular la, supra note 158.
160. The bill extended copyright protection "to the arts of designing, engraving, and
etching historical and other prints." See Thorvald Solberg, Copyright in Congress, 1789-
1904, at 128-30 (1905) (detailing the bill's passage in the House and Senate in April 1802 as
well as its signature into law by the President on April 29, 1802).
161. Statute of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436. The text of the 1831 statute can be
found in Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1001 n.2 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872). See also
Solberg, supra note 160, at 378 (showing that the statutory language under consideration
covered "musical composition[s]").
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photographs (1865),162 and works of art (1870).163 Commentators have
noted how expansions of copyright law subject matter were often responses
to technological developments. 164 But with the exception of photography,
these nineteenth-century expansions of copyright law were not prompted by
technological developments.
Indeed, eighteenth-century copyright had never been cleanly cabined to
"charts, maps, and books." There were both more general notions and
different, specific notions of the object(s) of copyright's affections. By the
end of 1786, all of the thirteen states except Delaware had passed copyright
laws. 165  Although most of these had come after Congress's
recommendation that the states protect "books," the state statutes varied
significantly. Connecticut, Georgia, and North Carolina presaged the first
federal act by expressly adding maps and charts to the list of protected
works. 166 As to different, specific notions, Connecticut, Georgia, and New
York had statutes extending liability to the unauthorized printing of an
unpublished "manuscript. ' 167 The statutes in Pennsylvania, North Carolina,
and Connecticut were similar to one another, referring to "books and other
writings [and] pamphlet[s] not yet printed. ' 16 8
162. Solberg, supra note 160, at 39 ("[clopyright of photographs"). Otherwise, Solberg's
history chronicles the procedural development of the amendments of copyright law in 1865
without substantive detail. See also Sarony, 111 U.S. at 53 (holding that it was within
Congress's power under the Intellectual Property Clause to grant a copyright in a
photograph). The United States' express protection of photographs followed quickly on the
heels of the 1862 amendment of English copyright law to expressly protect photographs. See
English Fine Arts Copyright Act, 1862, § 1; Keith Lupton, Photographs and the Concept of
Originality in Copyright Law, 10 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 257, 257 & n.7 (1988).
163. Solberg, supra note 160, at 197-204. According to Solberg, a bill "to secure the
copyright of paintings, drawings, statuary, and models" was introduced in the Senate in
February 1870. Id. at 197. It appears that these amendments were combined with other
patent and copyright amendments from the House which were signed into law by the
President on July 8, 1870. Id. at 204. Solberg's history chronicles the procedural
development of the amendments of copyright law in 1856 but does not give substantive
details on the contents of that amendment.
164. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430-
31 (1984) (discussing the influence of technology on development of copyright law); Jessica
Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 Or. L. Rev. 275 (1989).
165. See generally Crawford, supra note 157, at 13; Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing
Copyright's Mythology, 6 Green Bag (2d Series) 37, 37-38 (2002).
166. Crawford, supra note 157, at 19; see Horatio Marbury & William H. Crawford,
Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia 342 (1802).
167. 1 Laws of the State of New York 275 (2d ed. 1798) (printed by Thomas Greenleaf),
quoted in Crawford, supra note 157, at 19. While the main provisions of New York's 1786
Act protected books and pamphlets, section IV gave the author rights to damages against any
party that might "procure and print any unpublished manuscript." Id. at 299. The Georgia
statute is similarly constructed with protection of "unpublished manuscript[s]" in a last
section 4. See Marbury & Crawford, supra note 166, at 343.
168. 11 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, at 272 (1906)
(compiled by James T. Mitchell and Henry Flanders). To be completely accurate, the
Pennsylvania statute referred to "books and other writings" in the "recital" sections, id. at
272, while referring to "any book or pamphlet not yet printed" in the operative rights
provisions, id.
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As to more general notions, the concept of "literary works" and "literary
productions" appeared in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island statutes. 169 The preamble to New York's 1786 Act states that each
author should receive "the price that may arise from the sale of his or her
works."' 170 Considered as a whole, both the variations in late eighteenth-
century language and the nineteenth-century expansion in coverage evince
an acceptance that the basic rationales for copyright-both incentive and
desert-based reasoning-extended to artistic and literary endeavors beyond
"books" as ordinarily understood.171
English law shows similar developments. The Statute of Anne had
expressly protected "books," but the preamble of the Act had stated that
Parliament's intention was to protect "books and other writings."' 172 This
allowed English jurists to imbue the statutory word "book" with a "far more
comprehensive signification" than its ordinary use, 173 forestalling any need
to amend English law until 1842. In fact, expansion of the "book" concept
in England began as early as 1777 when Lord Mansfield concluded, in Bach
v. Longman,174 that a sonata was a book within the meaning of the statute.
Lord Mansfield reasoned that the statute was "not confined to language or
letters"'175 and that the same incentive rationale applied to composers as
well as text authors: "A person may use the copy by playing it; but he has
no right to rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
of them to his own use." 176 Eleven years later, a one sheet "musical air,
tune, and writing" was protected as a "book" in Storace v. Longman. 177
Storace was followed by Hime v. Dale (1803) and Clementi v. Golding
(1809),1 78 the conclusion in both cases being, again, that a composition on a
single sheet might be protected under copyright as a "book." The Clementi
court concluded that "book" in "its original meaning . . . signifies any
169. These similar statutes referred to "literary productions" in their titles and "all Books,
Treatises, and other literary Works" in the operative statutory provision. See 4 Laws of New
Hampshire (Revolutionary Period: 1776-1784), at 521 (Henry Harrison Metcalf ed.).
170. 1 Laws of the State of New York, supra note 167, at 274, quoted in Crawford, supra
note 157, at 14.
171. As the 1976 House Report describes it, "The historic expansion of copyright has also
applied to forms of expression which, although in existence for generations or centuries,
have only gradually come to be recognized as creative and worthy of protection." H.R. Rep.
No. 94-1476, at 51-52 (1976).
172. This was discussed by Lord Mansfield in Bach v. Longman, (1777) 2 Cowp. 623,
624. See also Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1001 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872)
(discussing the Statute of Anne); Eaton S. Drone, A Treatise on the Law of Property in
Intellectual Productions in Great Britain and the United States 140 & n.3, 141 n.3 (1879)
[hereinafter Drone on Copyright].
173. Drone on Copyright, supra note 172, at 140.
174. 2 Cowp. at 623.
175. Id. at 624.
176. Id.
177. Clementi v. Golding, (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1069, 1069 n.(b) (K.B.) (quoting Storace
v. Longman, (1788) 2 Camp. 27); see also Drone on Copyright, supra note 172, at 141-42.
178. Both cases are quoted at length in the report of Clementi v. Golding, 170 Eng. Rep.
at 1070.
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writing, without reference to size or form."' 179 In Hime, Lord Ellenborough
reasoned that if any narrower "construction were put upon the Act, many
productions of the greatest genius, both in prose and verse, would be
excluded from its benefits."' 180 A decade after Clementi, the King's Bench
considered a claim of independent copyright in a piece of instrumental
music which was itself printed in a bound volume of musical compositions.
In White v. Geroch,181 Chief Justice Abbott opined that
any composition, whether large or small, is a book within the meaning of
this Act of Parliament. It is perfectly clear, that it would be a book, if
printed as a separate and distinct work; and if so, it seems to me, that it
does not lose that character, by being found in company with other
compositions. 182
In this passage, Chief Justice Abbott established that a work remains a work
even when it is included in a compilation work, but he also celebrated the
indeterminacy of a size requirement for copyright protection.
American courts similarly embraced a broad understanding of "book." In
the 1829 case of Clayton v. Stone, the court considered a claim to copyright
in a newspaper and concluded "a book within the statute need not be a book
in the common and ordinary acceptation of the word ... it may be printed
only on one sheet, as the words of a song or the music accompanying it."',83
In the 1848 Scoville v. Toland case, 184 Justice John McLean, riding circuit,
faced the question whether a label was a "book" within the meaning of the
Copyright Act of 1831. Justice McLean's decision denied copyright based
on the functional nature of the label, but recognized that copyright might
attach to "compositions which are intended to instruct and amuse the reader,
though limited to a single sheet or page."'185
179. Id. at 1069.
180. Id. at 1070 n.(b) (quoting Hime v. Dale, (1803) 2 Camp. 31).
181. (1819) 106 Eng. Rep. 376 (K.B.).
182. Id. at 376.
183. Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1000 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872). While
denying the claim on other grounds, the court also reasoned as follows:
The literary property intended to be protected by the act is not to be determined by
the size, form or shape in which it makes its appearance, but by the subject-matter
of the work. Nor is this question to be determined by reference to lexicographers,
to ascertain the origin and meaning of the word book. It will be more satisfactory
to inquire into the general scope and object of the legislature, for the purpose of
ascertaining the sense in which the word "book" was intended to be used in the
statute.
Id.
184. 21 F. Cas. 863 (C.C. Ohio 1848) (No. 12,553).
185. Id. at 864. Justice McLean reasoned that the label at issue
[l]ike other labels ... was intended for no other use than to be pasted on the vials
or bottles which contained the medicine. As a composition distinct from the
medicine, it can be of no value . . . . As labels they are useful, but as mere
compositions, distinct from the medicine, they are never used or designed to be
used, This is not the case with other compositions which are intended to instruct
and amuse the reader, though limited to a single sheet or page.
Id., quoted in Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 432 (1891).
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Without a clear line defining "books," nineteenth-century
jurisprudence-both English and American-already had the germ of the
microwork problem in its basic reasoning, even before "work" was
integrated into the respective copyright statutes. In Hime v. Dale, the court
proudly trumpeted a rhetorical question about the proper scope of
copyright:
Every man knows that the mathematical and astronomical calculations,
which will inclose the student during a long life in his cabinet, are
frequently reduced to the compass of a few lines; and is all this profundity
of mental abstraction on which the security and happiness of the species
in every part of the globe depend to be excluded from the protection of
British jurisprudence? 186
Similarly, by 1879, Drone could review American law and write that
"[b]ooks entitled to the protection of copyright embrace the profoundest
work on the universe and the simplest rhyme for the nursery."'187 Protection
of the "compass of a few lines" or the protection of the "simplest rhyme"
already presents the problem: Were there any lower limits on size for a
copyrighted work?
When American copyright law was revised in 1909, the concept of the
"copyrighted work" finally became formally foundational.18 8 Yet neither
the Nimmer nor the Goldstein treatise comment on this shift in foundational
concepts. 189 Perhaps that silence is evidence that, by the time "work" was
integrated into the statute, the ambiguities latent in "work" had already
percolated through copyright thinking.
III. OUR PRESENT, DISINGENUOUS DOCTRINE AND THE ALTERNATIVE: AN
EXPRESS MINIMUM SIZE PRINCIPLE
Courts and the Copyright Office have consistently held that titles and
short phrases are outside the scope of copyright despite the fact that
"nothing in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution nor in the new
Copyright Act itself expressly precludes protection for titles under the
copyright laws."' 190 Rule 202.1(a) of the Copyright Office's regulations
provides a list of things outside copyright protection: "[w]ords and short
phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs;
mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere
186. Clementi v. Golding, (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1069, 1070 n.(b) (K.B.) (quoting Hime
v. Dale, (1803) 2 Camp. 31).
187. Drone on Copyright, supra note 172, at 144.
188. Copyright Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-76 (1909). Section 1 recited all the
copyright holders' rights and was the 1909 counterpart to section 106 of the 1976 Act.
Section 1 defines each right in terms of "the copyrighted work." Id. It was one thing to
include "works of art" in the 1870 list of things protected under copyright; it seems quite
different to make a "work" the basic coin of copyright.
189. See 1 Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright §1.13.2.3(a), at 1:337-38 (3d ed. 2005)
(describing the expansion of copyright subject matter).
190. Kirkland v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 425 F. Supp. 111 1, 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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listing of ingredients or contents."1 9 1 The portion of this rule that bars
copyright in titles and names has a long pedigree in both American and
English case law. By 1879, the Drone treatise on copyright could
unequivocably state that "[t]he mere title of a book, magazine, newspaper,
or other publication, is not a subject of copyright.' 192
On the other hand, Drone is silent about "short phrases" or "words." It is
unclear when and how the bar became more generalized into the prohibition
expressed in Rule 202.1 (a). According to William Patry, the "practice of
denying registration to words and phrases dates back at least to 1899.' 9 3
At least as early as 1958, prior to the formulation of 202.1(a), the U.S.
Copyright Office had expressly put "short phrases" into its understanding of
the prohibition. Released that year, Copyright Office Circular No. 46
announced that "[b]rand names, trade names, and other short phrases cannot
be copyrighted, even if they are distinctively arranged and printed."'194
Courts that withhold copyright protection from words and short phrases
often reject such claims with the idea/expression dichotomy, the scenes-6-
faire doctrine, or the merger doctrine. 195 When the question of copyright in
words or short phrases is isolated, the dominant justification for the Rule
202 bar is that short phrases simply lack the modicum of creativity for
protection under copyright. In other words, sufficient "creativity" only
arises at a larger granular level, i.e., too short equals not creative equals not
copyrightable. 196 For example, in the Trademark Cases the Supreme Court
reasoned that even if the category of "writings" was "liberally construed" to
191. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2004).
192. Drone on Copyright, supra note 172, at 145.
193. 1 William Patry, Copyright Law and Practice 333 n.89 (1994).
194. See also H.R. Rep. No. 90-83, at 14, 15 & n.1 (1967) (discussing the precursor of the
1976 Copyright Act and noting that the bill did not extend copyright protection to "the
fringes of literary property" including "titles, slogans, and similar short expressions").
195. See, e.g., Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding
that the plaintiffs command code values were "unprotectable as scenes a faire because they
were dictated by external functionality and compatibility requirements of the computer and
telecommunications industries"); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705
(7th Cir. 1972) (examining copyright on short phrases as well as copyright on different
labels and aspects of labels); Perma Greetings, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 598 F. Supp 445,
448-49 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (finding that phrases such as "hang in there," "message," and
"along the way take time to smell the flowers" are unprotected and considering ideas of
images and simple design characteristics to be uncopyrightable); Alexander v. Haley, 460 F.
Supp. 40, 45-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that any substantial similarities between works
pertained to unprotected ideas, materials in the public domain, devices covered by scenes 6
faire, or "cliched language, metaphors, and the very words of which the language is
constructed").
196. See, e.g., Bell v. Blaze Magazine, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1464, 1466 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (finding that similarity of titles could not give rise to infringement because "[w]ords
and short phrases, such as titles or slogans, are insufficient to warrant copyright protection,
as they do not exhibit the minimal creativity required for such protection"); Arica Inst., Inc.
v. Palmer, 761 F. Supp. 1056, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Fragmentary words and phrases do
not exhibit the minimal level of creativity necessary for copyright protection."), aff'd, 970
F.2d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1992) ("We further agree with the district court that of... 250
alleged instances of alleged copying ... all but twenty or so refer to single words or short
phrases which do not exhibit the minimal creativity required for copyright protection.").
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include trademarks, trademarks-paradigmatically words or short
phrases-were neither sufficiently "original" nor sufficiently "founded in
the creative powers of the mind"' 97 for protection under the Copyright
Clause. 198 Similarly the Nims 1947 treatise on trademark and unfair
competition notes that "[t]he right secured by the copyright law is the right
to use a literary composition-the product of the mind and genius of the
author-not the name or title given to it," 199 implying that the title is not a
product of the author's mind.
Perhaps the leading case taught to law students in this area is Magic
Marketing v. Mailing Services of Pittsburgh, Inc., in which phrases like
"Telegram," "Priority Mail," and "Contents Require Immediate Attention"
appeared in plain text on the plaintiffs envelopes. 200 The court held that
such words lacked the minimum creativity necessary for copyright
protection.201 Similarly, in Takeall v. Pepsico,20 2 the court concluded that
the phrase "You've got the right one, uh-huh" did not "evince the requisite
degree of originality to entitle it to copyright protection." 20 3 Expressing
this classic justification for the Rule 202 bar, Professor Paul Goldstein
writes, "The traditional tests of copyrightability-originality and expressive
content-offer the surest quantitative guides to copyrightability. The
shorter a phrase is, the less likely it is to be original .... -204 Discussing
197. Presumably, there is no difference between these standards in post-Feist analysis,
although one could certainly have argued prior to Feist that "original" was a lower standard
than "creative." See Hughes, supra note 93, at 98-106 (exploring the "multivalent notion of
creativity").
198. The Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). In the 1891 case of Higgins v. Keuffel,
the Supreme Court wrestled with the question of whether the expression on a label could be
subject to copyright. 140 U.S. 428 (1891). In Higgins, Justice Stephen Field reasoned that
"mere labels" were outside copyright because they lacked even the distinctiveness of a good
trademark; Justice Field's opinion can be read to suggest that trademarks were somehow
higher up the originality scale than "mere labels." What does "it" refer to in the following
passage?
A trade mark may, sometimes, it is true, in form, serve as a label, but it differs
from a mere label in such cases in that it is not confined to a designation of the
article to which it is attached, but by its words or design is a symbol or device
which, affixed to a product of one's manufacture, distinguishes it from articles of
the same general nature, manufactured or sold by others, thus securing to the
producer the benefits of any increased sale by reason of any peculiar excellence he
may have given to it.
Id. at 433.
199. 2 Harry D. Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade-marks § 272, at 889
(4th ed. 1947).
200. Magic Mktg. v. Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769, 771-72 (W.D.
Pa. 1986).
201. See id. at 772 (holding that "the terse phrases on the envelopes" lacked "the minimal
degree of creativity necessary for copyright protection").
202. No. 93-1237, 1993 WL 509876 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 1993); see also Murray Hill
Publ'ns, Inc. v. ABC Commc'ns, Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 633 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
short introductory phrase used by a radio DJ was dictated by "functional considerations
inherent in conveying the desired information" about the radio show and not sufficiently
creative).
203. Takeall, 1993 WL 509876, at *7.
204. 1 Goldstein, supra note 189, § 2.7.3, at 2:96.
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copyright in the United Kingdom, J.A.L. Sterling and M.C.L. Carpenter
similarly observe, "Copyright will not normally subsist in the titles of
works, since these will not usually constitute 'original' works, particularly
where a few obvious words have been used. 20 5
The problem with this reasoning is apparent. Even assuming that the
shorter the phrase is, the less likely it is to be original, that does not deny
the existence of thousands or millions of short phrases that are original
enough to cross the modicum of the creativity threshold. A rule of general
probability is not always the best foundation for an absolute bar.20 6 The
reality is that titles, names, and short phrases can be quite creative.
Consider Octavio Paz's vision of the titles used by Mexican photographer
Manuel Alvarez Bravo in the 1930s:
The titles of Manuel
are not loose ends;
they are verbal arrows,
blazing signals.20 7
Consider the first sentence in the first short story Eudora Welty kept a
copy of, a sentence from which, by her own admission, Ms. Welty had to
redeem herself: "Monsieur Boule inserted a delicate dagger into
Mademoiselle's left side and departed with a poised immediacy." 20 8
Clunky, but unquestionably original by the standards we use in
copyright. 20 9 With the same number of words-sixteen-William Carlos
Williams's poem "The Red Wheelbarrow" has had a powerful influence on
205. Sterling & Carpenter, supra note 155, 1 222, at 56.
206. A rule of general probability may justify an absolute bar where a combination of one
or more of three conditions apply: (a) The probability, while general, is very high; (b)
banning the unharmful, occasional contrary cases is justified because the identification of the
contrary cases is difficult or costly; and/or (c) the injustice done (or inefficiency created) by
denying rights/status to the contrary cases is low. With copyright claims, "(b)" does not
apply-identification of the contrary cases is done regularly by courts-but "(a)" and "(c)"
might apply.
207. Paz goes on to write:
The eye thinks,
the thought sees,
the sight touches,
the words bum.
This poem by Octavio Paz appeared in a show of Manuel Bravo's photography at the Musco
Nacional Centre de Arte Reina Sotia in 1995.
208. Eudora Welty, One Writer's Beginnings 85-86 (1984); see also Vivian Gomick, The
Situation and the Story 57 (2001) (celebrating short phrases from an essay by Seymour
Krim, such as "in the crotch of the pleasure principle," "that profuse upstairs delicatessen of
mine," "a voice of scars and stars"); Roland Barthes, Le Plaisir du Texte 44 (1973)
(recounting a single pleasurable phrase from Bouvard et Pcuchet, "Des nappes, des draps,
des serviettes pendaient verticalement, attachds par des fiches de bois A des cordes tendues,"
and observing "I love here the excess of precision, a sort of manic exactitude of language, a
folly of description"); id. at 132-33 (discussing the power of a passage from Loren Eisely).
209. Commenting on this opening sentence, decades later Welty wrote, "I'm afraid it was
a perfect example of what my father thought 'fiction' mostly was. I was ten years older
before I redeemed that in my first published story, 'Death of a Traveling Salesman."' Welty,
supra note 208, at 86.
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American poetry.2 10 We can go smaller too. Copyright's low threshold of
creativity is surely crossed by Italo Calvino's beautifully evocative title, If
on a Winter's Night a Traveler,2 11 or Lina Wertmuller's 1974 film title,
Travolti da un nsolito destino nell'azzurro mare d'agosto (Swept Away by
an Unusual Destiny in the Blue Sea ofAugust).
It is no surprise that our lack of creativity justification has led courts to
reason that truly creative titles and short phrases do merit protection. In
1947, a California state court reached the conclusion that if a title is
"arbitrary or fictitious or fanciful or artificial or technical," it might achieve
copyright protection. 2 12 In the 1965 case, Life Music, Inc. v. Wonderland
Music Co.,2 13 a Southern District of New York court left us with dicta that
copyright was possible for the single word
"supercalifragilisticexpialidocious" (a word that is not just the main lyric
and leitmotif of a popular children's song, but also the song's title). 214 And
if Mary Poppins's favorite adjective is copyrightable, what about
"scrumpdillyishhus" 2 15 or even the verb "grok"?
As Jessica Litman puts it baldly, "Coined words are not copyrightable
despite the fact that some of them are demonstrably original. '2 16 But she
does not pursue the obvious implication: that it is disingenuous to justify
the Rule 202 bar in terms of lack of creativity. It would be better to
acknowledge that such short phrases may manifest creativity 2 17 but remain
outside the ambit of copyright because they are not "works." Indeed, lack
of creativity has long been understood as tenuous grounds for the Rule 202
bar.
Unspoken dissatisfaction with lack of creativity as the foundation for the
Rule 202 bar is manifest in the Copyright Office's own regulations. While
210. William Carlos Williams, Spring and All: XXII. The Red Wheelbarrow, in 1 The
Collected Poems of William Carlos Williams 224 (A. Walton Litz & Christopher
MacGowan eds., New Directions Books 1986). In the words of one scholar, the poem "had
a pretty powerful influence on American poetry ... for its compression, its creativity, and its
effort to achieve both those aims in a natural American speech rhythm." Email from
Professor Robert Longsworth, Professor Emeritus of English, Oberlin College, to Justin
Hughes, Associate Professor, Cardozo Law School (June 7, 2004, 22:18 EST) (on file with
author).
211. Italo Calvino, If on a Winter's Night a Traveler (William Weaver trans., Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1981) (1979).
212. Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 187 P.2d 474, 482 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1947).
213. 241 F. Supp. 653, 654, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
214. This is a point not lost on at least one subsequent court. See Tree Publ'g Co. v.
Warner Bros. Records, 785 F. Supp. 1272, 1275 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
215. This was a word invented by marketers for Dairy Queen in the 1970s. See David's
Dairy Queen, http://www.davidsdairyqueen.comlhistory.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2005).
216. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965, 1013 (1990).
217. In fact, Professor Goldstein recognizes this point in respect to titles-that some "are
sufficiently original and expressive to qualify for protection." 1 Goldstein, supra note 189, §
2.7.3, at 2:97-98. He then prescribes copyright protection for titles in such circumstances.
Id. § 2.7.3, at 2:98. In contrast, I would rupture the "shortness equals not original" inference
completely, but still deny copyright protection to the full range of things under Rule
202.1(a).
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Rule 202.1(a) bars copyright in "[w]ords and short phrases such as names,
titles, and slogans," the regulation does not say why. Copyright Office Rule
202.10(b), discussing labels, leaves things hanging further: "A claim to
copyright cannot be registered in a print or label consisting solely of
trademark subject matter and lacking copyrightable matter." 218 That just
restates the obvious: A claim to copyright cannot be registered in
(anything) lacking copyrightable matter.
The Copyright Office's own Compendium of Copyright Office Practices
supports the point that this exclusion is not based on a lack of creativity:
Noncopyrightable material. The following are not copyrightable and
therefore cannot serve as a basis for registration.
Names, titles, slogans, and other short phrases. Names, titles, slogans,
and other short phrases or expressions are not copyrightable, even if such
expressions are novel, distinctive, or lend themselves to a play on words.
Similarly, a mere listing of ingredients or contents is not copyrightable.219
It would be difficult to say that an expression which is "novel" and
"distinctive" does not meet the copyright law's minimum threshold of
creativity/originality. Indeed, the Nimmer treatise makes much the same
point, observing that "[a]s a matter of first impression, it might well be
argued that fanciful original titles should be regarded as a form of literary
expression, protectible under the copyright laws." 220
In its 2003 brief in the exasperatingly protracted Southco litigation, the
U.S. Government finally fessed up: Its brief recognizes that "even a
creative short phrase is not protected by copyright 221 and "we note that the
Copyright Office will not register even a creative short phrase." 222 The
U.S. government's brief in Southco does not explain why the creative short
phrase is to be unprotected. The only reasonable way to interpret this
statement is implicit advocacy of a minimum size principle. The next two
parts explore, respectively, the reasons for a free-standing minimum size
principle and the difficulties in implementing such a principle.
218. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (2004).
219. U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium II, §§ 305, 305.01 (Supp. 1998), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/compendium/; see also U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 34 (2002),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ34.pdf. It appears that predecessor
guidelines of the Copyright Office provided that "[b]rand names, trade names, slogans, and
other short phrases or expressions cannot be copyrighted, even if they are distinctly arranged
or printed." Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.
1959) (quoting Copyright Office Publication No. 46, September 1946).
220. 1 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 158, § 2.16, at 2-185.
221. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 16, Southco, Inc. v.
Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d. Cir. 2004) (No. 02-1243), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201034.pdf.
222. Id. at 15.
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IV. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR A MINIMUM SIZE PRINCIPLE IN COPYRIGHT
The reasons for a minimum size principle today are no different than they
have always been: (a) Protecting microworks, would do no good and (b)
protecting microworks would do some harm. Protecting microworks would
do no good because the legal system already has various incentives for the
production of small creations in several ways and there is no evidence that
those incentives are inadequate. On the other side of the ledger,
independent protection of these small creations would arguably do harm by
diminishing the public domain and producing unnecessary transaction costs
through fragmentation of the copyright "markets." These points about
incentives, transaction costs, and the public domain are familiar ones-and,
without empirical evidence, the arguments remain products of intuition-
driven contention. 223 As a separate type of harm, protecting microworks
would have deleterious effects on other parts of the structure of copyright
law-making the fair use doctrine, de minimis defense, merger doctrine,
etc., either overworked or unworkable. I separate this adverse consequence
because it is a question of law, not empirical fact, and therefore one about
which legal scholars can be more confident.
A. No Further Incentive Is Needed for the Production of Short Phrases
There are already ample incentives for the production of titles, words,
short phrases, single evaluations, small symbols, or other small creations.
Circumstances in which a small, valuable creation is intentionally produced
typically-perhaps always-involve: (a) a small creation which can be
protected under trademark law, (b) inclusion of the small creation in a
larger work which copyright traditionally protects, (c) a small creation
produced under contract for a particular person or entity, and/or (d) a small
creation produced for nonmonetary reasons.
Protection of titles under trademark or unfair competition law is
frequently recognized by courts and commentators, both American and
foreign.224 As mentioned above, this might have been one reason that the
223. See Litman, supra note 216, at 997-98 (discussing some of these arguments and
noting that "[i]n the absence of empirical data, the result of economic analysis is dictated by
the model's placement of the burden of proof").
224. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 312-13 (2d
Cir. 1934); Manners v. Triangle Film Corp., 247 F. 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1917) (finding that
protection was warranted only if the title "Happiness" had acquired secondary meaning such
that the public would be misled); Nimmer, supra note 107, at 141. See generally Victor S.
Netterville & Barry L. Hirsch, Piracy and Privilege in Literary Titles, 32 S. Cal. L. Rev. 101
(1959). In the U.S., such recognition dates at least to Benn v. Leclerq, 18 Internal Revenue
Record 94, 95 (C.C. Boston 1873) ("Cases may occur in which a title is protected
independently of the contents of the book. But they would not occur under the copyright
laws. . . . [T]he protection granted would be analogous to that granted in case of
trademarks."). See also Aronson v. Fleckenstein, 28 F. 75, 78 (C.C.N.D. I11. 1886)
(concludeing that the owner of the operetta Erminie had a right to prevent the defendant
from using the same name for a different operetta on trademark-esque grounds "that the
name of this composition belongs to this complainant as identifying and describing his
literary property, and as a part of the piece itself'); Drone on Copyright, supra note 172, at
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bar on protection of titles congealed earlier than the more general bar on
protection of words and short phrases. For words or short phrases not
protected by trademark law, there is the more general and more important
point that the copyright system already establishes incentives for the larger-
sized res: books, newspaper articles, scripts, songs, taxonomic databases,
websites, etc. An entity like Maclean Hunter, CDN, or the ADA appears to
have adequate incentive for the preparation of the larger works at issue as
long as the larger work is protected against substantial copying (including
sequential mining). The incentive for titles, names, and designations
themselves comes via the need to market books, films, short stories, music,
appliances, tract houses, fasteners, and detergent -markets which are
already secured by intellectual, real, and chattel property laws.
For the economics of other microworks, let us return to the observation
earlier: If the Maclean Hunter experts had prepared one valuation at the
request of, say, Sotheby's, no one would think that that number was
copyrightable. Many evaluations are prepared for what we identify as
service industries, not for products. Examples include a consultant's asset
valuation for a company's acquisition or liquidation, a mediator's valuation
of one party's legal claims, and a psychologist's evaluation of a job
candidate for a particularly stressful position. In each of these cases, the
result will be a single microwork, e.g., the company's west coast operations
are worth $8.3 million. But no one who writes about business, economics,
or law ever posits that these things are under-produced for want of
copyright protection.
These microworks inhabit an environment akin to the artistic patronage
system that produced most cultural works prior to the rise of copyright. No
intellectual property incentive is needed because the consultant, the
psychologist, the economist, and the mediator already have a "patron"
145 (stating that "[a] title is treated as a trade-mark, in which the owner's rights are
recognized and protected on general principles of equity" and that a title which "has the
requisites of a valid trade-mark" can be registered as such); id at 535 ("There can be no
copyright in a mere title; but, on general principles of equity, an injunction will be granted
restraining a person from appropriating the title of a well-known publication for a rival
work."). In France titles can be protected via an action for "concurrence drloyale" (unfair
competition). Andr6 Lucas & Henri-Jacques Lucas, Trait6 de la Propridt6 Litt~raire &
Artistique [Treatise on Literary and Artistic Property] 108, at 101-02 (2d ed. 1994).
According to these authors, the terminology of French case law on titles shows that the
judges are thinking in trademark and unfair competition concepts, not copyright concepts. Id.
Some countries do provide for protection of titles under their copyright laws, but typically in
such a way that makes it clear that the title is not understood as a "work." For example,
article 2 of Senegal's copyright act provides that "[t]he title of a work is protected as the
work itself if it presents an original character. No one may, even if the work is not protected,
use the title to identify a work of the same genre if this use is likely to cause confusion."
Suivis du Reglement General, Bureau Senegalais du Droit d'Auteur, Textes Relatifs au Droit
d'Auteur et au B.S.D.A. [Texts Concerning Copyright and the Senegal Copyright Bureau] 9,
11. The original French text reads as follows: "Le titre d'une oeuvre est protdgd comme
l'euvre elle-m~me d~s lors qu'il prrsente un caractre original. Nul ne peut, m~me si
l'cuvre n'est plus prot~gd, utiliser ce titre pour individualiser un euvre du m~me genre si
cette utilisation est susceptible de provoquer une confusion."
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paying for the final product. Separately, there is also what might be called
the "Oscar Wilde principle": Much of the world of witticisms, pithy
observations, and insightful judgments exists because of nonmonetary
incentives. There is no need to propertize and monetize what arises in
abundance from our desire to socialize.
At this juncture, it may be worthwhile to distinguish the minimum size
principle from other proposals to remove intellectual property protection
from a certain class or kind of "work" because no incentive is needed.225
Most arguments about excluding certain classes of works from copyright
protection suffer from (a) creating an impractical system that (b) assumes
technological and/or business stasis. For example, one could argue that
movie posters, film promotion web sites, and perhaps even movie
soundtracks do not need copyright protection because their cost is folded
into the production and distribution costs of a (copyrighted) film.226 But
how would one write a law that distinguishes a movie poster from the
broader universe of posters that adorn college dorm rooms, many of which
need copyright protection for their production? 227  Or a promotional
film/video from any other "short"-how would we define the unprotected
category? 228 And when the promotional works generate their own market
225. In addition to proposals to remove intellectual property protection from certain
classes of creative works or innovations, it is common to see proposals that intellectual
property rules should be tailored to specific classes of creative works or innovations, such as
different terms of copyright protection for different kinds of works. See Dan Burk & Mark
Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155, 1157 (2002)
(describing doctrinal differences in patent law's handling of biotech and software patents,
then normatively advocating "how patent policy may be tailored to provide optimal
incentives for innovation").
226. For an interesting parallel to this argument, consider the "spin-off theory" advanced
to limit the scope of the European Union's 1996 Database Directive. Because the directive's
sui generis database right is expressly intended to protect the investment in databases, the
argument has been that the sui generis right should not extend to databases that are simply
"spin-offs" of preexisting commercial activities. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, The "Spin-Off'
Doctrine in the Netherlands and Elsewhere in Europe, (unpublished manuscript) (paper
presented at the Fordham University School of Law eleventh annual conference on
International IP Law and Policy in April 2003), available at
http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/spinofffordham.html. The European Court of
Justice recently embraced a version of the "spin-off' theory. British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. &
Others v. William Hill Org. Ltd., Case C-203/02, 2004 E.C.R. 1-10415, available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&
numdoc=62002J0203.
227. For example, perhaps the most ubiquitous poster in male college rooms in the 1970s
was the famous Farrah Fawcett-Majors swimsuit poster of 1976. Although not produced by
Aaron Spelling or any entity affiliated with Charlie's Angels, the poster's release was
perfectly timed with the television show and practically everyone identified the poster with
the television show. See Jack Condon & David Hofstede, Charlie's Angels Casebook 55-56
(2000).
228. For example, in 2004, Matador Records announced a competition to fund ten short
films "inspired by the music and the aesthetic of the band" Interpol. Matador's competition
told filmmakers expressly, "You must not make a music video. We are looking for artistic
films inspired by Interpol's music and ideas, not a promotional clip for a specific song." See
Matador Records: Interpol Short Film Contest, www.matadorrec.com/interpol/contest.html
(last visited Sept. 5, 2005).
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with sales and profits (think music videos) would one move that class of
works from unprotected to protected? Even without clever people gaming
the new distinction, the distinction that makes sense today is likely to make
much less sense tomorrow as markets and technology change.
A minimum size principle is different. Because most candidate
microworks are integrated into larger copyrighted works, the principle does
not leave identifiable categories of works unprotected. If our goal is to
create special incentives for the building of houses, we do not necessarily
need special incentives for the making of bricks or the mixing of mortar. In
the end, there is only the weak counterargument that incentives directed at
brick making will produce even better or even more bricks.229 However,
there is no evidence of this. Without such evidence that our bricks-short
phrases, titles, evaluations-are under baked, so to speak, we should
prevent the law from moving in that direction, whether through legislation
or judicial incrementalism. 230
There is the technology-enhanced danger that larger works will be
systematically tapped by the expression counterpart of data mining, a
process in which the copyist sequentially copies very small pieces of a work
and eventually reassembles the whole work. Microsoft has been concerned
about this problem as it has explored the "application service providers"
business model, one in which the online client never has the entire
application program on his or her computer, but is constantly fed needed
routines and subroutines. This kind of "expression mining" could produce
the economic effect of copying a substantial portion of a regular-sized
work. But this problem could be addressed by modifying our definition of
an event of copying, not changing our basic notion of a "work."
Addressing this problem was one of the intelligent components of the
justifiably maligned 1996 European Union Database Directive.231
229. The critical reader will say that this analogy is weak because chattel property law
will protect the bricks and mortar, whereas no proprietary law will protect the titles and short
phrases. But "pieces" of copyrighted works are usually kept private until publication, and
remain protected by privacy, unfair competition, and chattel property laws.
230. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Of World Music and Sovereign States, Professors and the
Formation of Legal Norms, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 155, 198-200 (2003) (advocating "a
demanding standard of proof needed to justify a change in the law" in the legislative
context); Robert Kastenmeier & Michael Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 417, 439-40 (1985) (same); see
also James Boyle & Jennifer Jenkins, The Genius of Intellectual Property and the Need for
the Public Domain, in The Role of Scientific and Technical Data and Information in the
Public Domain 10, 12 (Julie M. Esanu & Paul F. Uhlir eds., 2003) (concluding that
"fundamental tinkering in the absence of strong evidence that the tinkering is needed would
not seem like the optimal strategy"); James Boyle, A Natural Experiment, FT.com, Nov. 22,
2004, http://search.ft.com/search/index.html (search "Boyle" and "natural" and
"experiment") (lamenting the "empirical emptiness of the debates" about intellectual
property).
231. Council Directive 96/9 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20 (EC), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUfiServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996L0009:EN:H
TML.
2005]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
B. Such Protection Causes Transaction Costs and Effectively Shrinks the
Public Domain
The popular notion of the "public domain" includes works outside
copyright because of their age (Moby Dick), their ineligibility for protection
(Feistian databases), or their status as government works (statutes and
cases). But sub-copyrightable bits and pieces of protected works are
arguably as or more important to discourse and continued creativity than the
unprotected works. 232 J.H. Reichman describes the problem this way:
As tiny bundles of small-scale innovation covered by strong
intellectual property rights and strong contractual rights thus multiply,
they divide up the community's shared know-how into ever smaller
parcels that are withdrawn from the public domain. This produces a
tangled web of property and quasi-property rights that in itself constitutes
a barrier to entry and a disincentive to further small-scale innovation. 233
Reichman was writing about technological innovation, but the "tangled
web" could also apply to expression. 234 Microwork protection would mean
"smaller parcels [of expression would be] withdrawn from the public
domain."235 Many of us are intuitively repelled by such an idea, but if we
assume that the transaction costs were eliminated by some (unimagineable)
efficient system, would there be any problem with a system requiring
micropayments for the use of short phrases legally owned by others? The
answer is yes. This is a huge danger for even a modest version of the
"recombinant culture." This danger to the recombinant culture exists
regardless of transaction costs.
Technology holds out the prospect of solving the granularity problem
through virtually frictionless clearinghouses. But the question about
frictionless digital clearinghouses is not a technological issue; digital
clearinghouses will never work "frictionlessly" in the case of copyright
works unless we rewrite copyright law. This is because a copyright
clearinghouse can only function for works registered to the clearinghouse
232. See Litman, supra note 216, at 976. Litman writes,
But the class of works not subject to copyright is, in some senses, the least
significant portion of the public domain. The most important part of the public
domain is a part we usually speak of only obliquely: the realm comprising aspects
of copyrighted works that copyright does not protect.
Id.
233. Reichman, supra note 2, at 1776.
234. This problem of fine granularity effectively removing materials from the public
domain has also been recognized in the context of Internet rights management systems
which might require micro-payments for use of even the smallest amount of material from a
work. See Julie E. Cohen, Intellectual Privacy and Censorship of the Internet, 8 Seton Hall
Const. L.J. 693, 694 (1998) (discussing copyright management technologies "capable of
operating at a very fine level of granularity"); David Nimmer, Aus Der Neuen Welt, 93 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 195, 205 (1998) (discussing payments that would be required by a "cybercash
filter attuned with an ultrafine degree of granularity to the relevant copyright management
information"); see also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 Vand. L. Rev.
1799 (2000).
235. Reichman, supra note 2, at 1776.
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system. Since the Berne Convention requires that copyright arises (at least
for foreign works) without "formalities," 236 no law can require registration
in some clearinghouse mechanism as a condition for having enforceable
rights. Since copyright arises on fixation-most protected works will
remain unregistered 237-and therefore subject to substantial search and
uncertainty costs.
Concern for the minimum size threshold for liability under the
intellectual property system is not new.238 The difference here is the
problem is not driven directly by technological developments, where
technology triggers unanticipated adverse effects from an existing legal
concept, but by drift in the legal concept itself. This is similar to Rebecca
Eisenberg and Michael Heller's concern over "fine-grained" property
protection in genetic material, i.e., the problems that could occur if
exclusionary patent rights are awarded over gene fragments in such a way
that one would have to deal with a multitude of different owners in order to
assemble rights to a functional gene. 239 The drift in the CDN, Southco, and
American Dental Ass'n decisions shows courts doing what the United
States Patent and Trade Office ("USPTO") was flirting with doing in regard
to gene fragments: identifying a very small thing (expression or
innovation) as the protected res.
236. Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention provides that "[t]he enjoyment and the exercise
of these rights shall not be subject to any formality." Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended
on Sept. 29, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The
United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989. See Berne Convention Implementation
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §§ 7-9, 102 Stat. 2853. The United States has
consistently interpreted this as meaning that registration of works protected via the Berne
Convention (that is, foreign works) could not be required in order to exercise rights under
U.S. copyright law.
237. A world in which every work were "registered" upon fixation would be one in
which, for example, all composition occurred on networked PCs, so that the network could
instantly "register" and catalog your work each time it did a timed backup. If people are
permitted to use laptops-let alone pen and paper, canvases, unnetworked tape recorders,
etc.-millions of unregistered works sprout into existence at any given moment.
238. For example, Pamela Samuelson and J.H. Reichman have presented cogent analyses
of exclusionary entitlements becoming "finely grained." In his discussion of the "green
tulip," for example, Professor Reichman has explored the problem of how to reward an
innovator for a single subpatentable innovation without unduly burdening downstream
applications of that single innovation. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent
and Copyright Paradigms, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2432, 2504 n.401 (1994); Reichman, supra
note 2. Another variant of the "granularity" concern is that in a networked, digital
environment, copyright owners will be able to extract payments for all types of uses of
information products, including demanding micropayments for usages that everyone in the
past would have considered free and/or fair use. See generally Trotter Hardy, Property (and
Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 217 (describing and defending the
appropriateness of such a system).
239. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698-701 (1998); see also Burk &
Lemley, supra note 225, at 1195-96 (2002) ("A multitude of narrow patents seems likely to
strangle downstream product development in a morass of required licenses ....").
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Still, what would be the danger in a frictionless system of micropayments
for microworks? The public domain is society's accumulated information
stock. If we moved toward a system of ownership of microworks, the
stockpile of information capital would not disappear; one would just have to
pay a little to use it-no different than when an entrepreneur wants to
borrow money from the markets (our accumulated capital stock). These
new, additional costs might suppress some artistic and informational
production, at least initially. But according to one view, that decline would
correct itself over time. If the protection of microworks brings additional
royalties to owners of creative works, the larger income stream provides
more capital in economic sectors that generate creative works. Because of
increased revenue streams, subsequent creative works can be expected to
have increased budgets (that might pay for the increased payments to
microwork owners). 240
But we do not need to resolve that debate to see the redistributive impact
of the public domain (or its diminution). In the rosiest, most frictionless
scenario there is a difference in who accumulates capital, both
informational and financial. Independent protection of microworks and a
micropayment structure would transfer wealth to existing owners of
informational or financial capital. This would weaken the egalitarian,
empowering aspect of intellectual property: that it allows individuals with
little or no preexisting property to develop valuable property out of public
domain materials, completely unencumbered by obligations to prior
property owners. 241
240. This is a variation of one of the arguments used to justify the twenty-year extension
of copyright protection that Congress passed in 1998; it would bring additional revenue to
copyright owners which would, in turn, get plowed back into new copyrighted works. See,
e.g., S. Rep. No. 104-315, at 12 (1996) ("[T]he promise of additional income will increase
existing incentives to create new and derivative works."), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/s-repl 04-315.html. Stated that way, the argument
erroneously treats copyright industries as economically self-contained. If Disney is a
rational actor, when it makes an additional $100 million in copyright royalties, it should
invest that money where it brings the highest returns, whether in a new motion picture, a new
rollercoaster, or a high-tech hedge fund. As Dennis Karjala notes, the Senate report-and
companion documents-"mentions no mechanism for insuring that the extra income will
indeed be used for this purpose [new works]." Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of
Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 199, 207 & n.35, 208 (2002).
Conversely, if film projects are appealing they will attract capital from copyright owners,
French banks, French waterworks owners, and Canadian liquor company magnates. A better
form of the argument is that in a properly functioning market higher expected revenues for
any copyrighted work X will prompt larger investment in each X work and/or investment in
more X works, regardless of where the investment comes from. At that point, people can
disagree about the optimal level of investment in expressive works.
241. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287,
291 (1988) (arguing that intellectual property, by propertizing the "talent" of newcomers,
does not offer the conservative bias of property which some political theorists like Edmund
Burke advocate). A similar point is raised in Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the
Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright,
70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281, 295-96 (2003) (noting that "even if dropping transaction costs
allowed us to price discriminate perfectly," people can raise objections if their "allocative
tastes" do not favor giving the producer all the surplus value).
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C. A Minimum Size Principle Complements Other Elements of Copyright
Laws
Requiring works to be of a minimum size in order to qualify for
independent copyright protection comports with our presumptions about
independent creation as well as with how we use the merger, "fragmented
literal similarity," de minimis, and fair use doctrines. As to the first of
these, the doctrinal tenet that titles and short phrases lack originality has a
corollary in our presumption that larger works do have originality.
Generally speaking, microwork protection would complicate copyright
litigation as each case included proof and counter-proof on the question of
originality. Exemplary of this is Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc.,
concerning infringement of the phrase "You've got to stand for something,
or you'll fall for anything."242  The defendant prevailed on summary
judgment with evidence ascribing the same or similar phrase to Abraham
Lincoln, John Cougar Mellencamp, and Martin Luther King, Jr. On appeal,
Acuff-Rose contended that the copyright registration and a letter from
William Brock, the putative originator of the phrase, were both evidence of
the plaintiffs originality. Judge Guido Calabresi noted that "[b]oth of these
constitute some evidence that Brock thought he had come up with the
words on his own," but agreed with the district court that prior usage made
it exceedingly unlikely that Brock had independently created the phrase.243
Another side effect of microwork protection would be strenuous, if not
continuous, application of the merger doctrine. The 1998 Matthews v.
Freedman litigation concerned a t-shirt design centered on the phrase
"Someone Went to Boston and got me this shirt because they love me Very
much. '244 The court concluded that even if the "Someone Went to Boston.
." phrase was original to the plaintiff,245 a copyright over such a small
creation "would virtually give Matthews a monopoly on the underlying
idea."' 246 Professor Goldstein reasons that "the shorter a phrase is ... the
more likely it is to constitute an idea rather than an expression" and "the
shorter the phrase, the less likely it is to have acceptable substitutes, thus
barring protection under the merger doctrine." 247 Since a phrase always is
an expression of one idea or another, Goldstein's two points really say the
same thing: As the expression becomes smaller and smaller, it becomes
242. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 155 F.3d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 1998).
243. Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
244. Matthews v. Freedman, 157 F.3d 25, 26 (1st Cir. 1998).
245. The court concluded that it was "by no means clear" that the "sentiment" could be
original to Matthew. Id. at 28; see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 477 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that the case was based on a "claim of plagiarism of small
detached portions here and there" and that the plaintiff's songs were "of the simple and trite
character where small repetitive sequences are not hard to discover").
246. Matthews, 157 F.3d at 28. In Matthews, the plaintiff sought protection of a t-shirt
design that was both design and text, so the case was not, strictly speaking, a "short phrase"
case.
247. 1 Goldstein, supra note 189, § 2.7.3, at 2:96.
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much more likely that it is the only reasonable expression of a simple idea.
What we call "merger" must apply very frequently with short phrases.
Yet another place where microwork protection would grind against the
existing machinery of copyright is the "fragmented literal similarity"
doctrine. The doctrine of fragmented literal similarity248 is used to find
liability where the expressions taken from the plaintiffs work are not
individually large and appear scattered through the defendant's work.
Obviously, if the protected "work" becomes small enough, the fragmented
similarity doctrine becomes irrelevant; liability will attach for copying the
entirety of a choice slogan or turn of phrase because that is the "work." Put
differently, fragmented literal similarity between two works is not a single
fragment of literal similarity between two works.
The impact of microwork protection on the fair use doctrine and the de
minimis doctrine is both obvious and devastating. Microwork protection
simply makes a hash of each of these defenses which, in different forms,
consider whether enough was copied to constitute actionable copying.249
As Judge Leval observed in his example of a (copyrighted) extortion letter,
"If a communication is sufficiently brief, any quotation will necessarily take
most or all of it."'250
If a single number or short phrase or five lines of computer code is
independently protectable, then a person who thinks she has taken just the
tiniest bit from a book, program, or other normal-size work will find herself
liable for copyright infringement. If one tilts reality just a bit and looks at it
from an angle, one already has the obverse problem with the GNU General
Public License ("GPL"), the core instrument to insure that downstream
developments from open source software remain open source. 251 The GPL
is intentionally "viral" in that it provides that including any open source
software in a new software product renders that new software product as an
248. 4 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 158, § 13.03[A], at 53-59.
249. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that thirty characters copied out of fifty pages of source code was de minimis). While we
can acknowledge "the partial marriage between the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim
de minimus non curat lex," Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
451 n.34 (1984) (quoting Professor Latman), the de minimis defense is quite separate.
250. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1123 (1990).
Similarly, in 1963, during the attenuated process to produce the 1976 Copyright Act-and its
shift away from a registration system-one of the participants (himself a representative of
composers) commented,
I visualize a day on which every scrap of writing, every memorandum, every letter,
every piece of unidentifiable typescript is entitled to Federal copyright .... when
every scrap of paper, every writing of any kind becomes entitled to copyright,
there may be a strong public interest in having very minimal remedies with respect
to that [kind of work] ....
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., Copyright Law Revision, Part 4, at 23 (Comm.
Print 1964) (Transcript of Meeting on Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law:
Discussions of §§ 19-23, Chicago, August 15-16, 1963) (statement of Sydney M. Kaye,
Broadcast Music, Inc.).
251. GNU General Public License, Version 2 (June 1991)
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.txt.
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open source product, available to all.252  This aspect of the GPL-not
defining how much borrowing from an open source program converts the
borrower's work into open source-has caused much concern among
software companies. The microwork problem in software strangely works
in much the same way, i.e., if subroutines within a program become
independent works, then borrowing a small bit from a proprietary program
could render the borrower's new work into an authorized derivative work
and therefore, place that work in the public domain.
As for § 107 fair use, the third factor in the § 107 analysis-"the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole" 253-is directly sensitive to the size of the work; the smaller the
work, the more likely it is that the defendant will lose on this factor. But
the first and fourth factors are also sensitive to the size of the work. The
smaller the work, the less likely that there will be both copying and
transformative use, and thus it will be harder for the defendant to have the
first factor in her favor. 254 And as smaller and smaller creations are
recognized as the work, the logic of the system will tend to push courts to
see new markets for these very small works, creating an adverse effect on
the perceived "potential market" under the fourth factor.
252. This is the clear intent of the General Public License .("GPL"). At section 0, it
provides,
The "Program," below, refers to any such program or work, and a "work based on
the Program" means either the Program or any derivative work under copyright
law: that is to say, a work containing the Program or a portion of it, either
verbatim or with modifications and/or translated into another language.
(Hereinafter, translation is included without limitation in the term "modification.")
Id. And, at section 2, "You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in whole
or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, to be licensed as a
whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License." Id.
253. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
254. This is interpreting the first factor to mean genuine "transformation"; there are some
scholars who maintain that providing the work or parts of the work through a sufficiently
different avenue of transmission such that it does not supercede the first work counts as
"transformation." See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003). This
reading of transformation sits uneasily with the focus the Supreme Court gave the concept.
For the Court, the question is whether the "work merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the
original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message. It asks, in other
words, whether and to what extent the new work is 'transformative."' Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)). The passages emphasize that it is the work, not the
distribution mechanism, that needs to be transformative. More importantly, it should be
obvious that this collapses the first and fourth factors in § 107. There are four factors and we
are obliged to assume that each one means something different. "Transformation" of a work
is not photocopying it or offering it up through a different delivery mechanism. See Infinity
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that retransmissions are not
"transformative" uses); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that photocopies distributed within a company are not transformative works or
uses).
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V. FRAMEWORK FOR A MINIMUM SIZE PRINCIPLE
Commentators sometimes prescribe reforms that are infeasible, either
politically or operationally. The discussion here will sketch out a judicially
created minimum size test for text works, describing how these elements
could be codified by Congress in a definition of "work." But let us first
consider the political environment for such a proposal.
A minimum size principle would be politically feasible because major
music, publishing, and audiovisual companies have an interest in keeping
short phrases and single words readily available for their own use-the
same kind of interest which should rationally make them defenders of the
scenes-&-faire doctrine, nominative and descriptive fair use in trademark
law, 255 and the bar on federal government works being copyrighted, All of
these doctrines provide creative people, and the copyright industries, with
free inputs. Titles, names, and short phrases are used over and over again.
For example, there have been three major films titled "Moulin Rouge"; 256 a
best-selling song/album and unrelated teen film titled "American Pie"; 257
one popular song, three films, and a best-selling book (related to only one
of the films) titled "Helter Skelter"; 258 and a major film, a blockbuster
Broadway production, and an over-the-counter antihistamine called
"Contact. ' 259 And that is before we begin to plum the depths of substantial
similarity. No executive in the creative industries wants to create a
cognizable claim when Ray Bradbury says that Michael Moore's
"Fahrenheit 9/11" appropriated Bradbury's "Fahrenheit 451" title. 260
But is a minimum size principle that is separate from the originality
requirement substantively feasible? In Southco III, Judge Edward Becker
concurred in the result but disagreed that the short size of the numbers was
an independent reason to deny their copyrightability. Becker posed the
problem succinctly:
In order for any test that purports to distinguish between short phrases and
copyrightable compositions to be viable it would have to identify the
point at which a title or short phrase becomes a descriptive narrative.
255. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
256. Moulin Rouge (British Int'l 1929) (E.A. Dupont, director) (silent film); Moulin
Rouge (MGM/UA Studios 1952) (John Huston, director); Moulin Rouge (20th Century Fox
2001) (Baz Luhrmann, director).
257. American Pie (Universal Pictures 1999); Don McLean, American Pie (UA Records
1974).
258. The Beatles, Helter Skelter, on The Beatles White Album (Capitol/EMI Records
1968); Helter Skelter (One Shot Prods. 2000) (Jess Franco, director); Helter Skelter (Warner
Bros. 1976) (Tom Gries, director); Helter Skelter (Gainsborough Studios 1949) (Ralph
Thomas, director); Curt Gentry & Vincent Bugliosi, Helter Skelter: The True Story of the
Manson Murders (25th Anniversary ed. 1994).
259. Contact (Warner Bros. 1997) (Robert Zemeckis, director).
260. Yes, Ray Bradbury complained about this. See Frank Rich, The Best Goebbels of
All?, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2004, at AR1 ("This month Mr. Bradbury, now 83, complained
that Michael Moore had appropriated the title of 'Fahrenheit 451,' his classic novel about
book-burning totalitarianism, without permission.").
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Presumably the length of the writing in question informs this
determination, but what else?26
1
The "what else" to support the minimum size principle, particularly for
text works, is a multifactor analysis that appeals to (a) commercial
activities, such as investment decisions and marketing valuations; (b) our
intuitive sense of a "composition;" and (c) the registration practices of
copyright owners. Note what is not on this list. One thing not on this list is
the views of authors and critics about what constitutes a "work."
Postmodem literary theory will not help us in our quest for a manageable
understanding of a "work," precisely because it has recognized that
originality, creativity, and importance may come in very small packages.
Even limiting ourselves to text works, the range of things that strike us as
"works"-from Tolstoy novels to Dickinson poems-shows that we will
not be able to construct anything approaching a single, bright-line test for a
copyrightable work. The problem we are facing is hardly unique to
American law. According to Andr6 and Henri-Jacques Lucas, French law
on copyright protection of titles is "difficult to synthesize" 262 and "the
problem comes from too comprehensive a conception of the 'work"' 263-
exactly the problem festering in our law, as exemplified by the cases
reviewed in Part I. Although French jurisprudence consciously prohibits
copyright in titles even if they manifest originality, 264 Lucas and Lucas
conclude, quite rightly, that copyright protection should not be subjected to
an absolute "volume" test.2 65 If that is true, perhaps discretion, and a bit of
261. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. (Southco II1), 390 F.3d 276, 289 (3d Cir. 2004)
(Becker, J., concurring). Becker goes on to critique the majority: "The majority does not
specify the test, and this is not a situation, I respectfully submit, where we 'know it when
[we] see it.' . . . Whatever the test, I think the inquiry would inevitably draw us back to the
constitutional requirement of originality .... Id.
262. Lucas & Lucas, supra note 224, 108 (characterizing French cases about copyright
over titles as "une jurisprudence abondante, bien difficile A synth~tiser"). The authors
express understandable puzzlement that originality has been assumed in a number of
copyright cases over fairly pedestrian phrases.
263. Id. The French text reads as follows: "Le mal vient, croyons-nous, d'une
conception trop comprehensive de l'euvre de l'esprit."
264. See id. at 108, at 112 ("La jurisprudence en est bien consciente qui limite ici la
portde du droit d'auteur en posant que le titre, meme s'il est original, n'est pas protrg6 en
tant que tel contre tout usage, et notamment peut &re librement utilisd pour r~aliser un index
documentaire." The French text is translated into English as follows: "The jurisprudence of
it is quite conscious which limits here the range of the royalty while posing that the title,
even if it is original, is not protected as such against any use, and in particular can be freely
used to carry out a documentary index."); see also Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.]
[ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, July 13, 1989, Juris-Data 042828 (refusing
copyright protection of expression "bide centenaire" while recognizing that the phrase
showed a "flash of wit"), cited in Jan Klink, Titles in Europe: Trade Names, Copyright
Works or Title Marks?, 26 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 290, 294 (2004). It should be added that
disputes about title protection in France are complicated by moral rights considerations.
265. See Lucas & Lucas, supra note 224 ("Certes, la protection 16gale n'est pas
subordonnre A la taille ou au volume de la creation." The French text is translated into
English as follows: "Certainly, legal protection is not predicated upon the size or the volume
of the work.").
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hypocrisy, is the better part of valor. Are we better off with our myth that
lack of originality is the only bar to copyright? The discussion that follows
takes some baby steps toward a viable, thinkable minimum size principle,
separate from copyright's originality requirement.
A. Commercial Practices, Market Valuations, and Economic Viability
To date, the definitional lacuna for a "work" has troubled the copyright
system only infrequently. For example, in Edison v. Lubin,266 a 1903 case
which tested the copyrightability of Thomas Edison's new "moving
pictures," the district court ruled that each frame of the motion picture
required a separate copyright notice and registration because each frame
was a "photograph. '267 On appeal, the Third Circuit saw this was an absurd
result, particularly since any two frames, side by side, would be
indistinguishable. The court reoriented the concept of "photograph" 268-
hence, of "work"-to include a moving picture in its entirety.
But generally speaking the work is almost always taken as a given, at
least in the liability phase. The one area of law where the absence of a
statutory definition of a "work" has challenged courts is in damage
calculations, because copyright law affords statutory damages based on the
infringement of each work.269 In such cases, courts have provided various
commentaries on and formulations of what constitutes a copyrighted work,
some metaphorical and some more rigorous. A number of courts have
defined "works" as informational/cultural things that "live their own
copyright life," 270 a description as vivid as it is circular. Many of the same
266. 122 F. 240 (3d Cir. 1903).
267. Id. at 243. The district court reasoned that the "copyrighting system" applied to
"any... photograph," but not to any aggregation of photographs, and I think that,
to acquire the monopoly it confers, it is requisite that every photograph, no matter
how or for what purpose it may be conjoined with others, shall be separately
registered, and that the prescribed notice of copyright shall be inserted upon each
of them.
Id. at 241 (ellipsis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
268. The appellate panel did so by understanding that Congress intended to cover
technological progress:
When Congress, in recognition of the photographic art, saw fit in 1865 to amend
the act of 1831 and extend copyright protection to a photograph or negative, it is
not to be presumed it thought such art could not progress, and that no protection
was to be afforded such progress. . . . While such advance has resulted in a
different type of photograph, yet it is none the less a photograph-a picture
produced by photographic process.
Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
269. L. A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 104-06 (1919)
(interpreting 1909 Copyright Act).
270. MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d 766, 769 (11 th Cir. 1996); Robert Stigwood
Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir. 1976). The usefulness of cases like
Stigwood for our purposes is lessened by the fact that the court is directly grappling with
how many "infringements" there are, not with how many "works." This raises the prospect
of there being one infringement of multiple works. In other words, the court concluded that
the "infringement of performing rights of overlapping copyrights or substantial parts of the
entire work should be considered as a single infringement." Id. at 1104.
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courts have helpfully advanced the view that a copyrightable work is an
"expression [that] has an independent economic value and is, in itself,
viable." The Nimmer treatise expands this tentatively and inquiringly,
suggesting that "the work that is the subject of a separate copyright would
have to be in itself musically, dramatically, or otherwise viable .... ,271
But do these tests give us a good way to draw the frontiers of a work?
First, we must recognize that being "musically viable" or "dramatically
viable" is quite different from having "independent economic value" or
being "economically viable." I take musical viability and dramatic viability
to be issues of artistic integrity. While the answer to such questions has
some relevance to economic independence, the relevance is through the
intermediation of consumer expectations. Consumers probably would not
download digital tracks that cut off twenty-five percent of the song, even if
the file were discounted twenty-five percent. So works that are "musically
viable" or "dramatically viable" fall under the category of works discussed
below, where a work's "sense of composition" is considered. Here we are
focused on economic measures.
There are different ways to consider whether an expression has
"independent" economic value or viability. As discussed below, courts
have sometimes considered how the works were produced while, at other
times-and sometimes in the same opinion-courts have discussed how the
works were marketed. There is even an occasional reference to how
infringers act in their unauthorized copying. In other words, answering the
question of independent economic existence depends on looking at the
economics of the expression's "product cycle" at different points.
In MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, the court of appeals noted that "[e]ach
episode was produced independently from the other episodes and each was
aired independently from preceding and subsequent episodes. '272
Similarly, in Gamma Audio & Video Inc. v. Ean-Chea, the First Circuit
focused on the fact that "each episode in the Jade Fox series was separately
produced. '273  Alternatively, economic "viability" can be evinced by
marketing. The Gamma Audio & Video court reversed a trial court
conclusion that each episode of the television show was not a separate
work. The trial court noted that four episodes of a television series were
consistently sold to video rental stores together in one package, and found
that this was sufficient evidence that the four episodes constituted one
"work. ' 2 7 4 The First Circuit reversed, not only based on its reasoning that
each episode was separately produced, but also on reasoning drawn from
marketing. The court observed that the video stores that purchased' the
packaged series rented single-episode tapes to end-use customers who "may
271. See 4 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 158, § 14.04[E][1].
272. MCA Television, 89 F.3d at 769.
273. Gamma Audio & Video Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1117 (1st Cir. 1993).
274. Id. at 1115.
2005]
FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
view one, two, or twenty episodes in a single sitting, and may never watch
or rent all of the episodes ...."275
Another variation of the marketing perspective is to judge how the pirate
harms the copyright owner. In Edison, the Third Circuit reasoned "that [a
motion picture] is, in substance, a single photograph, is shown by the fact
that its value consists in its protection as a whole or unit, and the injury to
copyright protection consists not in pirating one picture [frame], but in
appropriating it in its entirety. ' '276 These inquiries, into how the value is
protected and how the defendant harms the plaintiffs economic interests,
have also been used to prevent the mere fact that multiple copyrights exist
from leading inexorably to the conclusion that multiple works have been
infringed.
The multiple-copyrights/single-work analysis was used to limit damages
in Robert Stigwood Group v. O'Reilly,277 concerning the unauthorized
performance of a rock opera. The opera was protected by three overlapping
copyrights (for the music, the libretto, and the vocal score), but the Second
Circuit concluded that they were not independently viable and, therefore,
that only one "work" had been infringed. 278 Eight years later, in RSO
Records, Inc. v. Peri, a Southern District of New York court reasoned that
where separate copyrights "have no separate economic value, whatever
their artist value, they must be considered part of [a] . . . 'work' for
purposes of the copyright statute." 279 Perhaps the most interesting result in
this family of cases came in the District of Columbia Circuit's conclusion in
Walt Disney Co. v. Powell:
While Mickey and Minnie are certainly distinct, viable works with
separate economic value and copyright lives of their own, we cannot say
the same is true for all six of the Disney copyrights of Mickey and Minnie
in various poses which the district court found to be infringed in this case.
Mickey is still Mickey whether he is smiling or frowning, running or
walking, waving his left hand or his right. Thus, we find that Powell's
mouse-face shirts infringed only two of Disney's works.280
Although it is black-letter doctrine that characters are only protected as
elements of copyrighted works, the court concluded that the defendant had
violated two copyrights, not six copyrights, although the Mickey and
Minnie poses came from six different movies.281 In other words, whatever
the doctrine tells us the "work" is, the harm was to Mickey and his mate.
275. Id. at 1117; see also Cormack v. Sunshine Food Stores, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 374, 376-
77 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that written tests designed to detect honesty and emotional
status, respectively, in the workplace are not one "work" for the purpose of statutory
damages just because they are packaged and sold together).
276. Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 242 (3d Cir. 1903).
277. 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1975).
278. Id. at 1104-05.
279. RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp 849, 862 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
280. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
281. See id. at 570 n.10 ("Two of the copyrights that Disney argued Powell infringed
portrayed Mickey and Minnie in poses used in the movie 'Steamboat Willie.' While
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These kinds of comments about episodes, film frames, characters, or
copyrights being "independent," "viable," or "valuable" are dissatisfying on
many fronts. Typically, they give only a partial analysis of the creative
market involved. With serial television-the subject of many of these
cases 282-the original decision to produce a television series is made after a
green light from the network authorizing a single season of the show
(anywhere from thirteen to twenty-two episodes). Similarly, each year, the
network renews or cancels the series. So is the season the proper unit of
production or economic viability? If the network has the contractual option
to cancel after the first five episodes because of low ratings, 283 are the first
five episodes themselves the real unit of economic viability? On the
marketing side, if the television show is eventually syndicated, it will also
be syndicated on the basis of seasons, not individual episodes.284
To further complicate things, economic viability and economic value are
quite different. If the test is whether any one episode has some independent
economic value, then each episode unquestionably has some value. The
fact that economic value of a whole exceeds the sum of the value of its parts
by a significant amount does not negate the potential that each economic
part may have significant value. The existence of significant value in the
smaller "part" seems to exist both in consumption and production.
It warrants pointing out that nineteenth-century English law also used a
production/marketing approach to measure when a single sheet of paper
could be a "book." In the 1842 amendment of the English Copyright Act,
"book" was defined "to mean and include every Volume, Part or Division
of a Volume, Pamphlet, Sheet of Letterpress, Sheet of Music, Map, Chart,
'Steamboat Willie' is a work that has a distinct economic value and a copyright life of its
own, Powell did not infringe any elements of the movie other than Mickey or Minnie. Thus
his infringement on the characters completely overlaps any infringement of the movie.").
282. Audiovisual serialization had, of course, a strong nineteenth-century counterpart in
nineteenth-century publishing practices in which serialization of novels through publication
in periodicals and "three deckers" was much more common than today. See generally Lee
Erickson, The Economy of Literary Form: English Literature and the Industrialization of
Publishing, 1800-1850 (1996); J.A. Sutherland, Victorian Novelists and Publishers (1976);
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership: Reconsidering Incentives in a
Digital Age, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 1121, 1156-62 (2003) (additional sources cited therein).
283. According to director Harry Winer (Dawson's Creek, Party of Five, Alias, Tarzan,
Summerland, etc.), current network practice may lead to a new show being pulled anywhere
from two to fourteen episodes into the first season as networks chase ratings. E-mail from
Harry Winer, Director, to Justin Hughes, Associate Professor, Cardozo Law School (June
21, 2004, 17:14 PST) (on file with author).
284. In MCA Television Ltd v. Feltner, the defendant faced a huge damage award for the
unauthorized airing of MCA television shows. Against MCA's claim that each episode was
a work that had been infringed, the defendant "assert[ed] that the industry practice is to enter
contracts for television series, not individual episodes of series, and that no one would
purchase and air just one episode of a series." 89 F.3d 766, 769 (1 1th Cir. 1996). Although
Feltner lost, the most suitable vantage point to judge "economic viability" in the ex ante
structure of copyright is arguably this investment decision perspective.
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or Plan separately published .... ,,281 Thus, status as a "book" was
triggered by separate publication, so that a page from a book would not be
protected as a "book," but a page printed and distributed as a flyer (a "Sheet
of Letterpress") would be. This separate publication test was a harbinger of
the economic viability test used by American courts to define "works" for
purposes of statutory damage calculations. Like its twentieth-century
descendant, the separate publication test is helpful, but had ambiguous,
manipulable edges. 286
On the other side (the consumption side-we all have favorite scenes),
one person might be unwilling to pay to see all of Star Wars: The Clone
Wars again, but would pay a small fee to see the Yoda/Count Dooku fight
scene again. 287 Another person might feel that way about the dance
sequences in a Gene Kelly movie or Moulin Rouge. Bob Fosse's dance
sequences can be watched for their own glory, regardless of the Cabaret
storyline, and you do not need to know anything about the stories to
appreciate the cinematographic style of individual scenes by Nestor
Almendros (Days of Heaven) or Michael Chapman (Raging Bull). This
separate consumption value is probably quite limited and "locked up," so to
speak, by our distribution channels. But it exists nonetheless.
As to production, a film's car chase scene has its own independent
economic value in the sense that it was probably budgeted separately. 288
There are any number of reasons a scene might have its own separate
budget: The scene might be shot on location, require the construction of its
own sets, require particular special effects, or simply be added later in the
process.289 The special effects scenes, the scenes at different locations, or
the action scenes may involve completely different production entities. As
soon as a scene has a recognizable, separate budget, it becomes subject to
judgments about value and worth, and, in this sense, has its own
285. An Act to Amend the Law of Copyright, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45, § 2 (Eng.). The
Act also provided protection for "Dramatic Piece[s]" defined as "every Tragedy, Comedy,
Play, Opera, Farce, or other scenic, musical, or dramatic Entertainment ..... Id.
286. The "separately published" criterion, however, could itself be made a subjective test
of whether or not something was a free-standing work. According to one commentator
interpreting the 1842 law, "Each part of a book that is separate, and clearly distinguished in
the volume itself was separately published within the meaning of s. 2 of the 1842 Act ....
The author of a book could have copyright in the letterpress and the copyright in the
illustrations belong to anouther." Earl of Halsbury, 7 Halsbury's Laws of England 540 n.(c)
(Viscount Hailsham, ed., 2d ed. 1932) (citations omitted).
287. For the official description of Yoda and Count Dooku's fight using lightsabers and
the Force, see Starwars Databank, http://www.starwars.com/databank/character/yoda/ (last
visited Sept. 26, 2005).
288. Typically, with an action movie, there is a primary filming budget and a "second
unit" budget. The second unit does all explosion, stunt, and heavy action scenes. E-mail
from Allison Wilke, Producer, Hollywood Homicide (Columbia TriStar 2003), to Justin
Hughes, Associate Professor, Cardozo Law School (Oct. 31, 2005 06:10 PST) (on file with
the author); E-mail from Harry Winer, supra note 283; E-mail from Jeri Taylor, Producer of
Star Trek: Next Generation and Star Trek: Voyager, to Justin Hughes, Associate Professor,
Cardozo Law School (on file with the author).
289. These expenditures are typically budgeted as "additional photography." E-mail from
Allison Wilke, supra note 288.
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independent economic value. Of course, the production of these scenes is
in service to a greater objective: telling the story of the entire film or
television episode. But as soon as we resort to talking about these elements
being made "in service to" a larger goal, we are moving back to the
intuitive idea of a "work" or "composition."
Consider what is one of the most convincing cases about economic
viability: one in which all or almost all viability measures fall one way. In
Video Aided Instruction, Inc. v. Y & S Express, Inc., the district court
concluded that printed study booklets and audio home study recordings
were "not separate viable works worthy of separate awards" from
infringement of the videocassettes which they accompanied because "these
booklets and audio portions are merely subunits of the . . . video-cassette
series."290 Here almost everything lines up: One would not produce the
booklet without the videocassette, one would not market the booklet
without the videocassette, one would not buy the booklet without the
videocassette. And yet it is almost everything because we can still find
ways to parse out independent economic status for the booklet. Perhaps the
booklet was produced by a subcontractor who sent a bill to the videotape
company: If that were true, from the subcontractor's perspective, wouldn't
the booklet have independent economic value?
The reader may have an obvious question: In these damage calculation
situations, plaintiffs have an incentive to obtain damages for infringement
of as many "works" as possible, so why hasn't the "microwork" issue been
more fully vetted in these disputes? The answer is that the United States
Code expressly prevents "double" counting, providing that for purposes of
damage calculations "all the parts of a compilation or derivative work
constitute one work. ' 291 This has shielded courts from strenuous arguments
for microwork protection in situations where recognition of a microwork
would relabel the larger work as a "compilation" work.292 Undoubtedly, it
290. Video Aided Instruction, Inc. v. Y & S Express, Inc., No. 96-CV-518, 1996 WL
711513, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1996).
291. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000).
292. Although this provision has undoubtedly saved courts from what would have been
reams of briefing about what constitutes the "work," it has not protected them completely.
For example in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., MP3.com was found liable for
having copied tens of thousands of CDs as a first step in building its "Beam It" service. 92 F.
Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y.), later proc'ding at 109 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Universal Music Group ("UMG") argued that MP3.com's liability should be "per song" on
the grounds that each song is a "work." UMG argued that treating each song as a work for
calculation of damages was especially appropriate because MP3.com had "listed individual
songs, encouraged users to create their own playlists without regard to a given CD album,
and measured the traffic on its service according to the number of 'hits' received for each
individual song-title." Lionel S. Sobel, Oh, What a Tangled Web We Can Weave if We Can
Download Properties Claimed by Others, or at Least so We Believe, in Entertainment, Arts,
and Sports Law, ALI-ABA Course of Study 379, 390 (ALI-ABA 2001). In a later
proceeding, Judge Rakoff found these arguments inapposite against the clear direction of 17
U.S.C. § 501(c)(1), noting that "[w]hen Congress speaks, the courts must listen." UMG, 109
F. Supp. 2d at 225. This ruling, of course, reduced UMG's potential recovery to
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has also prevented overreaching claims concerning infringement of multiple
versions of the same work: As long as all the versions are derivative of the
original expression, there is only one "work" infringed.2 93
The statutory damages case law teaches us that the economic
independence test depends on how much independent economic value will
count and that the test is highly perspective dependent.
But there may be a bright lining to this cloudy problem. We do not need
to solve the puzzle of a creation's economic viability or independent
economic value in the absolute sense; we only need to solve the puzzle in
the context of the plaintiff's particular claim. We could take the perspective
that a separate work exists where a copyright owner, or its predecessor in
interest, made an economic decision to produce and distribute the work.
Though this approach does not solve all problems (the newspaper publisher
makes decisions about the paper and individual editions of the paper), it
helps address the microwork problem. None of the plaintiffs in the cases
discussed in Part I-Maclean Hunter, CDN, the AMA, the ADA, and the
hardware parts company-would have been able to show an economic
decision to produce and distribute single evaluations, key phrases, etc.
Perhaps the same applies to recombinant uses of the digital era; individual
software subroutines are not produced for distribution individually and
decisions are not to produce very short melodies for distribution
individually. With the possible exception of titles, a plaintiff will probably
be unable to show any economic decision concerning production and
distribution of a single phrase, paragraph, number, judgment, or
computation.
B. A Quantitative Threshold ofAmount of Text: A Sense of "Composition"
and Value for the Audience
There is a strain of American and English cases which, to varying
degrees, can be understood as requiring that a creation be a minimum size
or manifest a certain kind of integrity and/or minimum size. In a well-
known case from the 1970s, Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc.,294
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the phrase "most personal sort of
deodorant" was unprotectable because it was an "ordinary phrase" and
lacked "'an appreciable amount of original text.' ' 295  This case is
traditionally taught as holding that the slogan in question lacked originality,
but notice the court's phrase "appreciable amount," suggesting that too
approximately 1/12th of what it had been, facilitating the final UMG/MP3.com settlement
for $53.4 million. Sobel, supra, at 391.
293. For a discussion of this, see 4 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 158, § 14.04[E][1].
294. 466 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1972).
295. Id. at 711. (quoting Copyright Office Publication No. 46). See Kitchens of Sara Lee,
Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1959). Note that some commentators
seem to interpret this and the Alberto-Culver case as endorsing the "sufficiently short = not
creative = not protected" formula. See Robert A. Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright:
Cases and Materials 78 (6th ed. 2002). But, strictly read, the case does not require that.
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small an amount of original text will not justify copyright protection, even
if there is some original text.
Decades later, in 1998, the Second Circuit in Matthew Bender & Co. v.
West Publishing Co.,296 expressly reasoned that caption titles of court cases
could not be copyrightable, even if West Publishing could show that their
captioning manifested originality: "Even if these [captioning] choices
regarding which words to capitalize and shorten to form the West digest
title were an original inspiration, we doubt the decisions to shorten the titles
or capitalize certain letters would be copyrightable." 297  While Alberto-
Culver could be glossed over as saying that there was no originality, this
Matthew Bender language reasons that even where "West digest titles [are]
an original inspiration"-indicating that the titles may have a qualitative
modicum of creativity-there would still be no copyright. The most
reasonable inference is that copyright is precluded because the text is too
small.
In that same spirit, the U.S. Copyright Office's Publication No. 46 had
announced that "[b]rand names, trade names, slogans, and other short
phrases or expressions cannot be copyrighted," explaining that to be
protected by copyright, a work must contain something capable of being
copyrighted, that is "an appreciable amount of original text or pictorial
material.'298 While we quibble with the use of the word "work," the idea
of "an appreciable amount of original text" is a gem to be polished-a clear
statement of a quantitative threshold of text that must be present before
copyright takes hold.
There are also a small number of American and English cases which have
found that titles and short phrases simply are not "compositions" of the sort
that copyright is intended to protect. Here the requirement seems to shift
from a raw quantitative threshold of text to some notion of composition
completeness and/or integrity. The notion that copyright attaches only to
"literary compositions" was probably familiar to American lawyers in the
early nineteenth century, 299 but we can start later, with the Supreme Court's
1891 Higgins v. Keuffel decision. 300 In Higgins, the Court considered
whether a label on a bottled product was copyrightable. Endorsing Justice
McLean's holding in the earlier Scoville v. Toland circuit case, Justice
Stephen Field concluded that the labels "[were] intended for no other use
296. 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998).
297. Id. at 683; see also Signo Trading Int'l, Ltd. v. Gordon, 535 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (concerning a translated list of Arabic equivalents to 850 words and forty-five short
phrases in English, where the plaintiff had neither copyright in the individual words/phrases
or the compilation).
298. Kitchens of Sara Lee, 266 F.2d at 544 (quoting Copyright Office Publication No.
46).
299. For example, counsel in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4901), argued that the letters of George Washington were not "proper subjects of
copyright ... because they are not literary compositions, and, therefore, not susceptible of
being literary property."
300. 140 U.S. 428 (1891).
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than to be pasted on the vials or bottles" and, therefore, were of little or no
value as a distinct "composition." 30 1 Justice Field reasoned, "To be entitled
to a copyright the article must have by itself some value as a composition,
at least to the extent of serving some purpose other than as a mere
advertisement or designation of the subject to which it is attached. 30 2
Courts finding a particular label to be copyrightable, in light of Higgins,
have done so by finding that the particular label has "value as a
composition." 30 3 More generally, the point is that "[t]o be entitled to a
copyright, the article must have by itself some value as a composition" 30 4 or
"[t]he protection given by the copyright statute is to the property in the
literary composition, not to the title given to it."' 30 5 These statements about
value as a "composition" could be interpreted as assertions about originality
or even as assertions about economic value. But a reasonable interpretation
of these passages is that judges are using some sense of the integrity and
completeness of a "composition" to conclude that only such compositions
are protectable "works."
It might be objected that judgments about "value" as a "composition" get
us dangerously close to the kind of art criticism that Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes abolished from American copyright law in Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co.30 6 The best answer might be that this kind of aesthetic
judgment falls within the "narrowest and most obvious limits" that Holmes
understood to be both permissible and inevitable. In that sense, it is no
different than judgments about sufficient originality that are made in
copyright cases daily. In fact, aesthetic judgments about internal, artistic
integrity are regularly made by American judges in the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 cases 30 7 and already pop up in statutory damage
analyses. Again, serial television, not text, provides perhaps the most vivid
301. Id. at 432.
302. Id. at 431.
303. See, e.g., Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87, 93 (9th Cir.
1963) (finding the Pledge label copyrightable on "the proposition that labels which go
beyond a mere trademark are copyrightable; if a label has 'some value' as a composition, it
no longer is 'a mere label"'); Ansehl v. Puritan Pharm. Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932);
Fargo Mercantile Co. v. Brechet & Richter Co., 295 F. 823, 828 (8th Cir. 1924) ("[I]f the
label has literary or artistic merit and is not a mere advertisement, if it has some value as a
composition, at least to the extent of serving some purpose other than mere advertising, it
can be copyrighted.").
304. Courier Lithographing Co. v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 104 F. 993, 995 (6th
Cir. 1900); see also Higgins, 140 U.S. at 431 ("To be entitled to a copyright the article must
have by itself some value as a composition, at least to the extent of serving some purpose
other than as a mere advertisement or designation of the subject to which it is attached.").
305. Becker v. Loew's, Inc. 133 F.2d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1943).
306. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). Justice Holmes wrote, "It would be a dangerous undertaking
for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits." Id. at 351.
307. More extensive aesthetic judgments are regularly made in the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990 cases and, in other common law jurisdictions, by common law judges applying
moral rights provisions. See Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and the Dastar Decision
(Nov. 12, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=618783.
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example. In Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications International,
Ltd.,30 8 the issue was whether the eight-episode first season series of Twin
Peaks was one work or eight. On the issue of statutory damages, the court
stated,
The author of eight scripts for eight television episodes is not limited to
one award of statutory damages just because he or she can continue the
plot line from one episode to the next and hold the viewers' interest
without furmishing a resolution. We might well have a different situation
if a book written as a single work was then adapted for television as a
group of episodes, for example, the six-part television adaptations of John
LeCarre's "Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy" and "Smiley's People." Even in
such circumstances, though there would be but one book infringed, there
might be separate awards for infringement of each televised episode.
30 9
This reasoning reflects a "compositional" analysis; it reverberates off the
idea of a continuing "plot line from one episode to the next"-surely an
indication of an integrated composition or narrative whole. The court offers
that, despite this narrative integration, separate awards for separate episodes
may be warranted. But the court becomes more circumspect about multiple
audiovisual "works" being derived from "one book."
We should also consider the direction taken by English Chancery judges
in a curious case from the 1980s, Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Insurance
Consultants International, Ltd.,3 10 in which, in addition to trademark rights,
the Exxon Corporation asserted copyright in the word "Exxon." Exxon's
copyright claim to its own name was straightforward: English copyright
law protects "original literary works," and the word Exxon was
unquestionably original and was unquestionably composed of letters, that
is, literary. 3 11
Judge Graham, and subsequently his colleagues on appeal, immediately
recognized the problems inherent in copyright in a single word, particularly
the name of a company that would often be in the news. Judge Graham
noted "if the plaintiffs' argument is right .... [t]he consequences would be
far-reaching and probably in many cases objectionable . ... 312 In
expressing his frustration over Exxon's claim, Judge Oliver reminded us
that we must often rely on our common sense notions to apply statutory
concepts: "In my judgment it is not necessary, in construing a statutory
expression, to take leave of one's common sense, and the result to which
308. 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).
309. Id. at 1381.
310. (1981) 2 All E.R. 495, aff'd [1982] Ch. 119 (A.C.) (Eng.).
311. Counsel for Exxon argued straight from the dictionary: "The definition of 'literary'
in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3d ed. (1944), is: 'Pertaining to the letters of the
alphabet'-that is an earlier meaning-and 'Of or pertaining to, or of the nature of, literature
... or books ... 'Exxon Corp., 2 All E.R. at 500. So, Exxon "argued strongly that ... the
size of a literary work is immaterial; there is logically no reason why one word which is
written should not be a literary work just as much as a work of greater length; if otherwise
qualified because of labour expended on it, then it can be a literary work." Id.
312. Exxon Corp., Ch. 119 at 123.
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[Exxon's counsel] sought to drive us is one which, to my mind, involves
doing just that."'3 13
Without relying heavily on older English cases against the copyright in
titles,314 the Chancery judges emphasized their own common-sense notions
of an "original literary work." On appeal, Lord Justice Stephenson
reasoned,
I would have thought, unaided or unhampered by authority, that unless
there is something in the context of the Act which forbids it, a literary
work would be something which was intended to afford either
information and instruction, or pleasure in the form of literary enjoyment.
... I am not sure whether this ["Exxon"] can be said to be a "work" at
all; I am clearly of the opinion that it cannot be said to be a "literary
work."
3 1 5
Judge Oliver agreed that the word "Exxon" was not a literary work
because "[i]t conveys no information; it provides no instruction; it gives no
pleasure that I can conceive; it is simply an artificial combination of four
letters of the alphabet. '316 This notion that a protected "work" provides
information, instruction, or pleasure seems akin to the notion of a
"composition." It is in a cluster of these ideas that we can find the basis for
a minimum size-or perhaps minimum "nature"-principle for deciding
what is and what is not a "work."
Part II above proposed a number of reasons why the bar on copyrighting
titles emerged early. As the most valuable short phrases, titles generated
the most litigation and are also the short phrases most obviously protected
by a separate area of law, trademarks. But we now have a third reason.
With titles, there is a clear "composition" from which the short phrase (the
title) can be distinguished. Lord Justice Cairn's opinion in the 1867 case of
Maxwell v. Hogg317 gives us a good sense of this reasoning. Lord Cairn
began by questioning how the English copyright registration system could
work if copyright protected titles; he then reasoned that single-word titles
simply are not compositions:
It is quite absurd to suppose that the Legislature, in providing for.., that
which was to be the indicium, and the description of something
collateral-something outside the registry in the shape of a volume or part
of a volume-meant that by the registration of one word copyright in that
one word could be obtained, even although that one word should be
registered as what was to be the title of a book or of a magazine.... The
copyright which is contemplated by the Act must be a copyright not in a
word, but in some words in the shape of a volume or part of a volume,
313. Id. at 144.
314. Indeed, while ruling against Exxon, Judge Graham reasoned, "Nothing I have said
above is intended to suggest that I consider that a word which is used as a title can, as a
matter of law, never in any circumstances be the subject of copyright, and I would disagree
with dicta in previous cases to the contrary effect." Exxon Corp., 2 All E.R. at 503.
315. Exxon Corp., Ch. 119 at 143.
316. Id. at 144.
317. (1867) 16 L.T. 130 (A.C.) (Eng.).
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which is communicated to the public, by which the public are benefited,
and in return for which a certain protection is given to the author of that
work.3 18
Of all short phrases that might be protected, titles are the ones that can
most readily be juxtaposed against the more obvious work-the volume, the
newspaper, the story, the musical composition, etc. Lord Cairn then moves
to a broader point; the person seeking protection has to give us "a volume
or part of a volume." The first phrase suggests an intuitive idea of a
composition ("a volume or part of a volume") while the second takes us
back to economic value ("by which the public are benefited").
While the "compositional" approach has much to recommend it, and may
be the final arbiter, express or implicit, in the cases discussed above, there
would be considerable danger in announcing what constitutes the lowest
threshold for a composition. Intuitively, we might adopt a "haiku
principle"-haikus are perhaps the smallest text-based forms of art that are
taught to us as a "work. ''3 19 Much of Ezra Pound's best known imaginist
poetry also had roughly this size,320 such as these three poems:
In a Station of the Metro
The apparition of these faces in the crowd;
Petals on a wet, black bough.
32 1
Alba
As cool as the pale wet leaves
of lily-of-the-valley
She lay beside me in the dawn.
322
L'Art, 1910
Green arsenic smeared on an egg-white cloth,
Crushed strawberries! Come, let us feast our eyes. 323
But if we announced that was our minimum standard for a work, one
could imagine claims that single books or software programs constitute
hundreds of works each. It would be fine for courts to announce regularly
that they consider the "composition" issue, but not to announce a minimum
size for a composition.
318. Id. at 133.
319. One example is the verses recited in Kakuzo Okakura, The Book of Tea 82 (1989):
A cluster of summer trees,
A bit of the sea,
A pale evening moon.
320. My thanks to colleague Barton Beebe for this point, as well as the poems that follow
here.
321. Ezra Pound, Lustra: In a Station of the Metro, in Poems and Translations 287
(Library of Am. 2003).
322. Ezra Pound, Lustra: Alba, in Poems and Translations, supra note 321, at 287.
323. Ezra Pound, Lustra: L 'Art, 1910, in Poems and Translations, supra note 321, at 291.
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C. Copyright Registration(s)
Another measure of separateness of works discussed in at least a couple
statutory damage cases is how the expressions at issue were registered at
the Copyright Office. The argument is that if an owner registers all the
components of a series under one copyright registration, that suggests that
the owner considered them to be one work.324 Instead of focusing on an
"objective" view of the work, we could hold the plaintiff to his/her own
understanding and intent vis-A-vis the creation. 325
There are some complications. For example, a copyright owner can
register multiple works on one registration form.326 The issue is how the
works were listed on the form. Moreover, courts have not consistently
understood copyright registration and works to have a one-for-one
relationship. For example, copyright registration over a music album is
understood to constitute registration of each song and each song is treated
as a "work. '327 Still, reference to copyright registration may be particularly
appealing when the registration occurred well before litigation. In such
circumstances, among alternative conceptions of the work, we can choose
the conception the copyright owner chose.
D. Other Considerations
These three ideas-independent economic value, "compositional" nature,
and copyright owners' understanding-hardly exhaust the candidate criteria
for a multifactor minimum size analysis. For example, instead of focusing
on the economic perspective of the creative party, we might want to
consider their artistic perspective: Do they believe they are creating a
"work" or a composition? Unfortunately, the evidence here is likely to be
highly equivocal, with creators acknowledging-and wanting to be
324. See, e.g., Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116-17 (Ist Cir.
1993) (finding that the copyrights in the four episodes at issue were registered on one form).
325. Another option is to hold the plaintiff to the intent of the plaintiff's predecessor-in-
interest. It seems reasonable to place the plaintiff in those shoes.
326. See Gamma Audio & Video, 11 F.3d at 1116 (noting that, under regulations
promulgated by the Copyright Office, the copyrights in multiple works may be registered on
a single form, and thus considered one work for the purposes of registration while still
qualifying as separate "works" for purposes of awarding statutory damages) (citing 37
C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(3)(i)(A) (2004)); Video Aided Instruction, Inc. v. Y & S Express, Inc., No.
96-CV-518, 1996 WL 711513, at *5 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1996) (same); see also
Copyright Office Circular No. 62 (2004) (Copyright Registration for Serials) (describing
registration on a single form for collective works that are serials, understood as "periodicals,
newspapers, magazines, bulletins, newsletters, annuals, journals, proceedings of societies,
and other similar works"). But see Stokes Seeds Ltd. v. Geo. W. Park Seed Co., 783 F.
Supp. 104 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). See generally 4 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 158, §
14.04[E][l].
327. See MALACO Inc. v. Cooper & Costanza, No. 3:00-CV-2648-P, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12069 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2002). In MALACO, the defendant infringed four songs,
two each from two albums that were individually registered with the Copyright Office. Id. at
*3, *7. The court treated registration of each as registration of each song on the albums and
awarded damages per song. Id. at * 8, * 17.
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acknowledged-for their contribution to larger works, while also wanting
their contributions to be judged independently as meritorious.
Consider opening credits for films. The opening credit sequences for
major films are often produced by motion graphics designers, with
substantial independence from the film's director. These "title sequences
are self-contained overtures that amplify a movie's theme or plot. '328 The
perfect title sequence, according to motion graphics designer Randall
Balsmayer, "'must be so essential that the movie wouldn't be the same
without it .... [Yet] it should also exist as a complete film unto itself.' ' '329
Mr. Balsmayer characterizes his title sequences as "'a formal element of the
movie that you can use like a picture frame."' 330 So is a Balsmayer title
sequence part of the work or part of its "framing?" 331 From an artistic
perspective, does Mr. Balsmayer perceive himself to be preparing a
''complete film unto itself' or a contribution to a collaborative work? My
guess is that many creators pressed on this point would remain fiercely
"dual aspectual." 332
CONCLUSION
In the early 1990's Lloyd Weinreb observed that in the "marginal areas"
of intellectual property "the driving force . . . seems to be [the] legal
imagination, available to the better financed private interest, rather than a
careful, systematic effort to discern what will serve the community as a
whole." 333 But that does not say anything special about copyright. It is
endemic to the common law tradition that the law evolves largely through
legal imagination yoked to private causes, seeking individually maximal
outcomes that may cumulatively produce a suboptimal situation for the rest
of us. It is up to the rest of us to monitor these developments, detect overall
trends, and inform judges and policymakers of the directions in which we
are being pulled.
This Article explores how a series of court decisions-Maclean Hunter,
CDN, Delta Dental, etc.-are pulling copyright jurisprudence in a direction
in which each coin valuation or medical procedure code or parts numbering
is a copyrighted work. The dicta in these opinions could have devastating
328. Steven Heller, Giving Credits the Credit They're Due: A Survey of the Work of a
Three-Minute Auteur, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2004, at ARI 1.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. For a discussion of authorial control of "frameworks" for authors' works, see Justin
Hughes, The Line Between Work and Framework, Text and Context, 19 Cardozo Arts & Ent.
L.J. 19 (2001).
332. This phrase is borrowed from modem descriptions of Spinoza. Stuart Hampshire,
Spinoza (Faber & Faber Ltd. 1956) (1951). Spinoza "argued that the two pervasive features
of the Universe as it presents itself to our minds, the Universe as a system of extended or
spatial things and the Universe as a system of ideas or thought, must be interpreted as two
aspects of a single inclusive reality .... Id. at 49.
333. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Custom, Law, and Public Policy: The INS Case as an Example
for Intellectual Property, 78 Va. L. Rev. 141, 146 (1992).
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implications for fair use and the entire structure of copyright law. The
Southco III decision finally produced a solid court of appeals ruling that
numbers are too small to be copyrighted, regardless of originality. But the
reasoning in other appellate decisions could still be a platform for finely
granular claims of protection that copyright was never intended to provide.
Similarly, we must turn back results like those in Cook v. Robbins and
Andreas v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. In their most charitable reading,
these cases convert the qualitatively substantial taking doctrine of Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises334 into de facto independent
protection of very short phrases.
Under the suasion of skillful lawyering, judges can too easily lose sight
of what the "work" is, or should be. Consider an Eastern District of
Pennsylvania case that fell between Southco I and Southco II. In R&B, Inc.
v. Needa Parts Manufacturing, Inc.,335 R&B accused Needa Parts of
copying 1000 of R&B's 18,000 part numbers. The numbers were copied
from R&B's 1994 catalog. Although R&B claimed infringement of both
the catalog and the numbers, "[a]t the preliminary injunction hearing, the
plaintiff stressed the part numbers claim and barely mentioned the
catalog." 336 There was an obvious reason for that: Needa Parts' printed
materials looked nothing like R&B's 1994 catalog. Analyzing both claims,
Judge Mary McLaughlin concluded, on the strength of Southco I, that the
R&B part numbers were uncopyrightable because they lacked
originality. 337 Turning to the catalog claim, McLaughlin concluded that
copying 1000 numbers from a catalog with 18,000 numbers and substantial
amounts of text, graphics, and designs constituted only de minimis
copying.338 This second conclusion should have ended all copyright claims
in the case, but the pages of the opinion devoted to comparing plaintiffs
numbers to defendant's numbers implicitly, and mistakenly, treats the
numbers as some kind of independent work.
Courts need to repeatedly ask counsel (and themselves), "what is the
work at issue here?" When liability for copyright infringement boils down
to copying a name, a couple of choice phrases, a slogan, or a small subset of
numeric evaluations, copyright law is being dragged by clever lawyers into
dark alleys where it should not go. These dark alleys threaten some of the
most flourishing areas of recombinant culture-software programming,
collage art, the cutting and pasting of snippets which is a wonder of
digitization, criticism which requires significant quotation from the target of
criticism-whether by a Ph.D. candidate or a blogger.
This lurking microwork protection is the result of our having used the
originality requirement to justify copyright law's prohibition against
copying words and short phrases. The problem with small phrases is not
334. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
335. No. 01-1234, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17406 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2001).
336. Id. at *19.
337. Id. at *25.
338. Id. at *33-34.
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that they always lack originality: The problem is that they are always too
small. Existing case law gives us the material to develop, particularly for
text works, an understanding of the minimum size or nature of a "work"
that deserves to attract copyright protection.
Notes & Observations
